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Abstract: 
This research project will investigate the increasingly complex and dynamic relationship 
between China and Sudan from 1995 to the present within the context of Giovanni 
Arrighi’s understandings of World Systems Theory. In this project I will examine how 
the relationship between China and Sudan has manifested through trade, investment, 
and diplomacy since 1995. Further, this dissertation will situate Sino-Sudanese relations 
within the context of Giovanni Arrighi’s theories regarding the roles of China and 
Africa within the current world-system. As such, this study will ask how the 
relationship between China and Sudan reflects Arrighi’s arguments concerning core-
periphery relations, declining US hegemony, the economic rise of China and its 
potential hegemonic challenge. In addition, the scope of this dissertation will include an 
examination of Sudan’s economic and political landscape prior to and after 1995, along 
with an overview of Arrighi’s work concerning China, Africa and Sino-African 
relations. Thus, this project will examine how Sino-Sudanese relations with respect to 
trade, investment, and diplomacy in the twenty-first century, reflect Arrighi’s 
understanding of the current world-system. 
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Introduction 
The phenomenal economic rise of China together with its growing presence in Africa 
has attracted much recent debate among international relations researchers and authors 
(Raine, 2009; Scott, 2008; Friedman, 2010; Hofstedt, 2009). China’s deepening 
relations with resource-rich African countries such as Sudan, despite their governments’ 
domestic repression, has led Western scholars such as Halper to argue that China’s 
global rise “poses the most serious challenge to the United States since… the Soviet 
Union” (2010, p. iii). Other authors such as Hanson (2008) note that Chinese 
engagement has increased political stability and economic growth in Africa, whilst 
creating infrastructure largely neglected by the West:  
Africa registered 5.8 percent economic growth in 2007, its highest level 
ever, in part because of Chinese investment. Experts say the roads, 
bridges, and dams built by Chinese firms are low cost, good quality, and 
completed in a fraction of the time such projects usually take in Africa. 
(Hanson cited in Aseyehgn, 2009) 
 
However China’s engagement with African countries varies greatly, and this 
dissertation will focus on their complex and multifaceted relationship with Sudan, 
exploring its manifestations in trade, investment and diplomacy. The diplomatic 
dimensions of this relationship includes high-level diplomatic meetings, solidarity 
between the countries' political representatives at the UN, and political engagement at 
China-Africa institutions such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). 
Economic relations between China and Sudan include bilateral trade agreements, 
Chinese-funded low-interest loans and infrastructure packages, Chinese investment in 
Sudan’s oil and armaments industry, and Sudan’s importation of Chinese foodstuffs, 
technology and manufactured goods. Importantly this thesis will situate Sino-Sudanese 
relations within the context of Giovanni Arrighi’s understandings of the roles of China 
and Africa in the current world-system. 
 
This dissertation will use various terms specific to Arrighi’s theoretical perspective, 
such as ‘world-system’, ‘core-periphery relations’ and ‘hegemony’. The term ‘world-
system’ refers to the primary unit of analysis within World Systems Theory: an 
international socioeconomic system with “a single division of labor and multiple 
cultural systems” (Wallerstein, 1974, p. 390). The division of labour within this system 
divides the world into three groupings of countries: the economically dynamic 
industrialised ‘core’ countries; the economically dependent ‘peripheral’ countries; and 
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the transitional ‘semi-peripheral’ countries. ‘Core-periphery relations’ refers to the 
asymmetrical relationship between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ countries, resulting from 
unequal terms of trade between developed and developing countries which disadvantage 
those specialising in primary commodities” (Chase-Dunn & Rubinson, 1991, p. 43). 
Furthermore, following from Gramsci, the term hegemony’ refers to a state’s ability to 
not only dominate antagonists, but to convince aligned groups that its leadership is 
legitimate and mutually beneficial (Arrighi & Silver, 1999, p. 26).
1
 
 
Research Aims and Questions 
The overarching objective of this project is to systematically survey the literature 
regarding Sino-Sudanese relations since 1995, and how this reflects Giovanni Arrighi’s 
understandings of the current world-system. As such, this thesis will outline Arrighi’s 
theoretical perspectives on China, Africa, and the modern world-system, and assess how 
well this framework describes Sino-Sudanese relations. This study will be guided by 
two overarching primary research questions:  
1. How has the relationship between China and Sudan manifested through trade, 
investment, and diplomacy since the year 1995? 
2. How does this relationship reflect Giovanni Arrighi’s understandings of the current 
world-system?  
Furthermore, as Arrighi’s interpretation of World Systems Theory places relations 
between China and Africa within the wider context of core-periphery relations and 
hegemonic transition and crises, this study will also consider what insights Sino-
Sudanese relations provide regarding declining US influence in Africa, the economic 
rise of China and its potential hegemonic challenge.  
 
This dissertation argues that the relationship between China and Sudan is deeply 
unequal, despite leverage afforded to both Sudan and South Sudan by China’s heavy oil 
infrastructure investment and extensive provision of loans, and is therefore typical of 
core-periphery relations. It is advanced that Chinese aid, infrastructure and investment 
in Sudan and South Sudan are primarily motivated by securing oil, and the terms of 
                                                        
1 As Arrighi notes “hegemony is… the additional power that accrues to a dominant 
group by virtue of its capacity to lead society in a direction that not only serves the 
dominant group’s interests, but is also perceived by subordinate groups as serving a 
more general interest” (Arrighi & Silver, 1999, p. 26). 
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trade remain disadvantageous to Sudanese interests. Furthermore, this paper maintains 
that by economically and diplomatically supporting a pariah state such as Sudan, China 
is challenging US hegemony and the international norms which underwrite this 
privileged position. In addition, I will argue that China’s support of Sudan is 
representative of the growing relationship between China and the global South, which 
challenges US hegemony by reversing the outcome of the African debt crisis’ of the 
1980s and the detrimental impacts of IMF Structural Adjustment Policies. However, 
this thesis will also argue that Chinese engagement with Africa is also changing as 
China finds its stance of non-interference in other states’ affairs increasingly untenable, 
given its deepening involvement in the continent and the growing expectation that it 
will behave ‘responsibly’. 
 
This thesis will first review the literature regarding Sudan and Sino-Sudanese relations, 
then detail Arrighi’s theoretical perspectives on World-Systems Theory, China and 
Africa (Chapter One). It will then survey the general literature on Sino-African 
relations, and briefly examine China’s overall interests in Africa and the trends 
characterising their continental engagement (Chapter Two). The following chapter 
(Chapter Three) will specifically identify the key facets of China’s relationship with 
Sudan relating to trade, aid and diplomacy and how this relationship reflects wider Sino-
African relations. This thesis will then explore how the manifestations of Sino-Sudanese 
relations reflect China’s power ambitions and conform to or vary from Arrighi’s 
understandings of the modern World-System.  
 
Methodology 
In this dissertation I will employ an interpretative methodological model which uses 
both historical and theoretical reasoning to examine Sino-Sudanese relations since 1995. 
Morehouse argues that interpretative inquiry is the study of human actions and practices 
“acting in and with others in the world” (2012, p. 3). In addition, Morehouse argues that 
an interpretative model can utilise both quantitative and qualitative inquiry so long as 
they work together in a logically coherent way which enhances understanding (2012, p. 
4). Thus, an interpretative methodology enables the utilisation of qualitative information 
when there is a paucity of quantitative data, such as that concerning the secretive Sino-
Sudanese arms trade. In addition, I will employ historical research methods, including a 
comprehensive survey of available primary research and historiographical discussion, 
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and a critical examination and careful interpretation of source documents to ensure 
authenticity and provenance. This is critical due to the bias against Chinese involvement 
with Khartoum in Western and South Sudanese sources. 
 
The analytical framework used herein examines how states, people and society operate, 
interpretatively synthesising relevant information through historical and theoretical 
reasoning. Arnold argues that historians “get it ‘wrong’ because we cannot always agree 
with each other…[however], we try to stick to what we think the evidence actually says, 
to search out all the available material, to understand fully what is happening, and we 
never fabricate ‘the facts’”. (Arnold, 2000, p. 12). This approach is useful as I employ 
factually based historical reasoning to determine the most plausible interpretations of 
how China and Sudan have interacted through trade, investment, and diplomacy. This is 
consistent with World System Theorists such as Wallerstein and Arrighi who argue that 
theoretical understandings must be based on historical interpretation, and that World-
Systems Theory transcends the limited perspectives and scope of other models 
(Wallerstein, 1974).  
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Chapter One: Literature and Theory 
Literature on Sudan 
China’s engagement with African countries has generated much recent interest and an 
expansive body of international relations literature regarding the relationship. By 
comparison the body of literature analysing Sudanese society, from its pre-colonial 
history through to its independence in 1956 and the secession of South Sudan in 2012, 
is relatively small but diverse.  
 
Following decades of British rule over Southern and Northern Sudan, independence was 
granted to Sudan in 1956 as a single national administration dominated by Northern 
Sudanese officials (Johnson, 1988, p. 4). Ethnic and religious tensions between Sudan’s 
Northern and Southern territories soon resulted in two civil wars, one fought primarily 
between Southern Sudanese militia and the Sudanese military from 1962 to 1972, and 
another from 1983 to 2002 between the Southern SPLM/A and government forces and 
allied Arab militia (Chapman, 2008; Flint and de Waal, 2008). During these periods 
Sudan was ruled by a series of military regimes and unstable, factionally divided 
democratic governments unable to effectively combat the Southern forces (Chapman, 
2008). Colonel Oamr al-Bashir’s current Sudanese administration was established by a 
coup d’état on 30 June 1989, providing him with unfettered legislative powers and 
heralding a national divide-and-rule strategy that used Arab militias to repress 
insurgencies in troubled regions such as Darfur (Collins, 2008).  
 
The role of successive Northern governments in provoking conflict and escalating the 
two Sudanese civil wars has been explored in the following texts; Johnson, “The 
Southern Sudan” (1988); Verney, “Sudan: Conflict and minorities” (1995); Adar, “A 
state under siege: The internationalization of the Sudanese civil war” (1998); and Burr 
& Collins, Revolutionary Sudan: Hasan al-Turabi and the Islamist state, 1989-2000 
(2003). These texts are acutely critical of the Khartoum governments’ ‘aggressive’ 
behaviour during the civil wars, detailing the Northern regimes’ persecution of minority 
groups and violations of human rights, and international reactions to these offences 
(Verney, 1995). Furthermore, Adar (1994), Verney (1995), Burr and Collins (2003) are 
especially critical of the role Al Bashir’s government played in deliberately intensifying 
the North-South conflict in 1989, and the administration’s policies of ‘Arabisation’ and 
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‘Islamisation’ which provoked unrest among the non-Arab Southerners and Nuba 
peoples (Adar, 1994, p. 44). 
 
Although the SPLM/A and Al Bashir’s government formally ended the war in 2005, the 
government’s systematic neglect of deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Darfur 
soon led to insurrection there and its subsequent repression by Khartoum. As the 
conflict in Darfur garnered increasing international attention, many texts analysing the 
origins of the conflict emerged, along with re-evaluations of the Sudanese civil wars. 
This includes texts such as Reid, Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa: 
Genealogies of conflict since 1800 (2011); Flint & De Waal, Darfur: A new history of a 
long war (2008); Collins, A History of Modern Sudan (2008); and Chapman, “Why a 
minority rights approach to conflict? The case of Southern Sudan” (2008). These texts 
generally view the Sudanese Civil War and conflict in Darfur as the culmination of 
heightened political and economic distress, stemming from Khartoum’s social and 
ethnic marginalisation of groups in its remote provinces. As such, these conflicts are 
also viewed as the expression of long-standing tensions between North and South 
Sudan, and central government versus peripheral autonomy, originating between 200 
and 400 years ago (Reid, 2011, p. 249). In addition, texts such as: International Crisis 
Group, God, oil and country: Changing the logic of war in Sudan (2002); Chapman, 
“Why a minority rights approach to conflict? The case of Southern Sudan” (2008); and 
Simmons & Dixon, Peace by Piece: addressing Sudan’s conflicts (2006). These provide 
comprehensive analyses of the factors underlying the conflicts and preventing lasting 
peace, including regional underdevelopment, unequal allocation of resources, and the 
ethnic and religious grievances resulting from successive conflicts fought along 
ethnic/religious fault-lines (Chapman, 2008, p. 5). 
 
Modern Sudan is typically characterised as a failing state, lacking the capacity to 
effectively govern its remote provinces and provide basic utilities for much of the 
population
2
. Although in the early 1970s Sudan was considered the ‘bread basket of the 
Arab world’, the adoption of counterproductive economic policies in line with stringent 
World Bank and later IMF conditions has resulted in “more scarcity, skyrocketing 
inflation rates, huge budget and balance of payment deficits, economic stagnation and 
                                                        
2
 Sudan scoring an ‘alarming’ 21.5 on the 2012 Global Hunger Index (International 
Food Policy Research Institution, 2012) 
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widespread poverty” (Maharn cited in Elhadary and Samat, 2012, p. 214). The impacts 
of Sudan’s failed developmental policies are examined in studies such as: Abdalla, 
“Poverty and inequality in urban Sudan: Policies institutions and governance” (2008); 
Elhadary & Samat, “Political Economy and Urban poverty in the Developing Countries: 
Lessons learned from Sudan and Malaysia” (2012); and Gibbon, The World Bank and 
African poverty (1992).  
 
The seccession of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011, under the leadership of former 
SPLM/A leader Salva Kiir Mayardit, has also fundamentally changed the political and 
economic landscape of Sudan. The United States Institute of Peace’s More than a Lind: 
Sudan’s North-South Border (2010) usefully analysed the pre-secession tensions 
between Khartoum and the Southern administration, and their competing claims over 
resources such as gold, agricultural schemes, and oil fields in border areas like Heglig. 
Furthermore, the text by Matthew B. Arnold & Chris Alden “‘This gun is our food’: 
Disarming the White Army militias of South Sudan” (2007) is also relevant in its 
analysis of the factors preventing lasting peace and stability in the South, including the 
strong “proclivity of southern communities towards blood feuding and cattle raiding… 
[and] the continuing fluidity of the Ethiopia-Sudan border…[which is] problematic 
given the prevalence of armed groups and armaments on the Ethiopian side” (p. 381). In 
addition, after the secession of the South these tensions and drivers are further examined 
within the context of ongoing border conflict in articles such as Sarwar, “Post-
Independence South Sudan: an era of hope and challenges” (2012), and Sudan: Staff 
report for the 2012 article IV consultation (International Monetary Fund, 2012). 
 
Literature on China in Sudan 
Literature about Sino-Sudanese relations is limited prior to the early 1990s, although a 
small body of literature developed including authors such as Larkin who described the 
relationship as diplomatically ‘correct’ but characterised by limited economic 
engagement
3
 (Larkin, 1971, p. 174). However, international concerns over China’s 
growing engagement with Sudan from 1995 onwards has resulted in a growing body of 
literature dedicated to analysing Sino-Sudanese relations. This body of literature 
includes texts by international human rights watchdogs, such as Human Rights Watch’s 
                                                        
3
 It should be noted, however, that limited economic and diplomatic relations were 
representative of general Sino-Sudanese relations at this time (Larkin, 1971, p. 174). 
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Sudan, oil, and human rights (2003), which criticises China’s involvement with the 
Sudanese regime, claiming linkages between Chinese investment in Sudan’s oil industry 
and Chinese arms sales to Khartoum. Influential Sudan analyst, Daniel Large also wrote 
a host of texts critical of China’s non-interference policy in Sudan, but acknowledged 
that China’s foreign policy is slowly being forced to change from one of ‘impartiality’ 
into a more active mediator role. These texts include “China and the changing context 
of development in Sudan” (2007), “China and the contradictions of ‘non-interference’ 
in Sudan” (2008), and “China’s Sudan engagement: Changing northern and southern 
political trajectories in peace and war” (2009).   
 
In addition, papers such as Lee, Chan & Chan, “China in Darfur: Humanitarian rule-
maker or rule-taker?” (2011), and Shinn, “China and the Conflict in Darfur” (2009) 
critically evaluate the impacts of Chinese involvement with Khartoum in relation to the 
Darfur conflict. These papers note that China assisted Khartoum’s escalation of the 
conflict through the provision of tanks, fighter aircraft and small arms, the establishment 
of domestic Sudanese arms production, and economic support through trade and 
investment. Eric Reeves is another important source of information regarding Sino-
Sudanese relations, his work comprising fourteen years of extensive publication of 
analysis on Sudan. Texts by Reeves such as “China in Sudan: Underwriting genocide” 
(2006) are damningly critical of China’s involvement with Khartoum, noting that 
China’s “uncompromising and unqualified support for the regime at the UN Security 
Council” prevents a workable solution to the Darfur conflict and prevents regime 
change, whilst its role in expanding military infrastructure has assisted the escalation of 
conflict (Reeves, 2006).  
 
Furthermore, there are a small number of texts which seek to evaluate China’s 
relationship with Sudan in the context of China’s relationship with other African 
countries. Ali Zafar’s text “The growing relationship between China and Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Macroeconomic, trade, investment, and aid links” (2007) compares Chinese 
involvement in various Sub-Saharan countries, noting that China’s overall impact was 
beneficial for “Oil exporters and resource-rich countries, like Angola, Gabon, and 
Sudan, and base metal exporters, such as Mauritania” (p. 111-112). Further texts 
examining Sino-Sudanese relations in comparative perspective include: Carmody & 
Taylor, “Flexigemony and force in China’s resource diplomacy in Africa: Sudan and 
C34: Bachelor of Arts Honours 
Benjamin Hale, ID Number 10161199 9 
Zambia compared” (2010); Jackson, “Comparative Diplomacy: Chinese Relations with 
Sudan and Angola, 1959-2009” (2009); and “China’s Charm Offensive and 
Peacekeeping: The lessons of Cambodia – what now for Sudan?” (Hirono, 2011). 
Carmody and Taylor (2010) argue that China’s adaptation of their foreign policies to 
suit the ‘histories and geographies’ of individual states such as Sudan and Zambia has 
been highly successful in establishing China as an influential actor in Sub-saharan 
Africa. Jackson (2009) compares Sino-Sudanese and Sino-Angolan diplomacy, noting 
China’s increasing focus on infrastructure projects in the two countries, especially those 
facilitating petroleum production. Meanwhile, Hirono (2011) compares China’s 
economic, diplomatic and peacekeeping behaviour in Sudan and Cambodia, noting that 
China’s “pure state-centric approach fails to consider other important actors in the 
region of Darfur”, alienating locals and undermining China’s peacekeeping presence 
(Hirono, 2011, p. 338).  
 
Due to the limited academic literature analysing Sino-Sudanese relations, this 
dissertation draws from other resources such as Chinese and Sudanese government 
agency reports and government-sponsored media. China’s Energy Information 
Administration, Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provide 
valuable raw data concerning China’s economic engagement with Sudan. However, the 
accuracy of information offered by China’s state organs is dubious at best considering 
the extent of corruption and misinformation fostered by the CCP.
4
 Furthermore, there is 
a paucity of official data from China regarding trade with African countries such as 
Sudan, due to both a lack of transparency and Sudan’s status as a pariah state. 
Prominent Chinese news agencies including Xinhua, the People’s Daily, and China 
Daily, provide regular reports on diplomatic and economic relations between China and 
Sudan. However, Hassid argues that nominally independent news agencies operating 
within China are subject to censorship, monetary controls and overt coercion, whilst 
news agencies abroad such as South China Morning Post are increasingly pro-Beijing as 
a result of self-censorship (2008, p. 414). Furthermore, although data from the Central 
Bank of Sudan is highly suspicious, independent newspapers such as the Sudan 
Tribune, Sudan Vision, and New Sudan Vision, and the website for the Government of 
the Republic of South Sudan, are valuable sources of information.  
                                                        
4
 Authors such as Jean-Francois Tremblay (2010) and Junguo and Hong (2009) have 
noted that “statistical corruption has been found in China for years” (2009, p. 675) 
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Although China’s pursuit of relations with the newly independent Republic of South 
Sudan sorely lacks literature, China’s New Courtship in South Sudan (2012) by the 
International Crisis Group provides an indispensible examination of these relations. 
Additional literature exploring the relationship between China and African countries is 
explored in chapter 2. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework this dissertation employs is a political economy drawing on 
Giovanni Arrighi’s interpretation of World-Systems Theory, specifically in relation to 
the modern world-system. World-Systems theorists such as Wallerstein and Arrighi 
argue that the development of capitalism fundamentally re-structured the relationship 
between capital and the state, institutionally separating economics from politics whilst 
naturalising the ‘logic’ of capitalism (Teschke and Lacher, 2010). Although state 
decisions may disadvantage certain elements of the capitalist class, the state generally 
promotes the interests of capital-as-a-class by fostering the conditions necessary for 
economic growth, maintaining socio-political order, and promoting the interests of 
national capital in relation to other states (Chase-Dunn & Rubinson, 1991, p. 29). 
Furthermore, the needs of the state remain aligned with those of capital-as-a-class 
because of the state’s dependency on taxation revenue, the naturalisation of capitalist 
ideological discourse, and the institutional fostering of class consciousness (i.e. through 
education, professional networks, and leisure (Callinicos, 2010, p. 22; Davidson, 2010, 
p. 84). However, in states such as China and Sudan capitalism has not yet fully 
restructured the state-capital relationship, resulting in both shared personnel between 
state and capital, and significant interpenetration of state/capital interests. The Chinese 
state is still active in establishing a capitalist class, with many CCP members using state 
resources to establish themselves in private industry, whilst State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) operate as private enterprises (Arrighi, 2007). However, it should be noted that 
sections of capital also operate independently of central state policy and that there is 
factionalisation within the Chinese state. Furthermore, although China’s SOEs are 
bound to operate in the ‘national interest’, China’s oversight agencies lack direct 
authority over overseas SOEs, so “Chinese companies at times operate as much from 
transnational commercial imperatives as from national political reasons” (Scott, 2008, p. 
65). 
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World-Systems Theory is rooted in the Leninist analysis of imperialism, which argues 
that finance capital dominates industrial capital within developed countries and 
subsequently, as a result of the law of uneven development, developed countries 
“exploit… cheap labour and resources from the developing countries at the periphery of 
market interactions” (Isaak, 1991, p. 22). As such, World-Systems Theory proposes that 
the world is characterised by a global system “with a single division of labour and 
multiple cultural systems forming an international hierarchy in the ceaseless struggling 
of states and classes” divided into ‘core’, ‘peripheral’ and ‘semi-peripheral’ countries 
according to the division of labour (Isaak, 1991, p. 23; Wallerstein, 1980). In addition, 
World-Systems theorists argue that dependent economic elites may rise to power in 
peripheral states who facilitate exploitation of their nation by core states, for their 
mutual benefit (Hahn, 2008, p. 148). Chase-Dunn and Rubinson further expand on this 
noting that “power block[s]… [in peripheral countries] based on an economic elite 
whose predominant interests have been tied to the needs of core capital” have emerged 
alongside power blocks in core countries “based on an alliance between manufacturing 
and commercial interests” (Chase-Dunn & Rubinson, 1991, p. 38).  
Correspondingly, Arrighi argues that the dynamism of the core results from its 
dominant position over peripheral countries, as the asymmetrical exchange of 
commodities between core and peripheral countries transfers social surplus from the 
periphery to the core (Arrighi & Silver, 1999). As World-Systems theory is concerned 
with the interaction between groupings of capital and the state in ‘core’, ‘peripheral’, 
and ‘semi-peripheral’ countries, it is especially well-suited to analysing Sino-Sudanese 
relations as “the outcomes of China’s involvement in Africa will primarily be shaped by 
state-capital dynamics” (Power and Mihan, 2010, p. 474). 
 
Additionally, Arrighi argues that historically the capitalist world-system has been 
dominated by a series of hegemons, including the Netherlands, Britain and the United 
States. Following from Gramsci, hegemony differs from sheer coercive domination in 
that it consists of both domination of antagonistic groups and leadership of allied 
groups: 
[As such] hegemony is the additional power that accrues to a dominant 
group by virtue of its capacity to lead society in a direction that not only 
serves the dominant group’s interests but is also perceived by subordinate 
groups as serving a more general interest… If subordinate groups have 
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confidence in their rulers, systems of domination can be run without 
resort to coercion. (Arrighi, 2005, p. 32) 
 
Further, Arrighi notes that during periods of hegemonic transition “intensifying 
interstate and interenterprise competition interacts with… increasingly dysfunctional 
social conflict, leading to periods of systemwide rebellions, state breakdowns and 
revolutions” (Silver & Slater, 1999, p. 151-152). According to Arrighi, hegemonic 
transition between Britain and America began with the Great Depression of 1873-1896, 
and continued throughout two world wars and the Great Depression of the 1930s 
(Arrighi, 2005, p. 102). Following this, the post-war financial structures established at 
Bretton Woods such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), along with the gold-dollar exchange standard, institutionalised 
American hegemony. As such, American hegemony was institutionally underpinned by 
both Western predominance in the United Nations and control of the global economy’s 
most powerful institutions, the IMF and World Bank (Silver & Slater, 1999, p. 210). 
Furthermore, the promotion of Keynesian macroeconomic measures backed-up by US 
power and prestige “in the form of military governments in the defeated countries and 
Marshall Plan aid for the Allies” (Silver & Slater, 1999, p. 205) pushed Third World 
countries to undertake nation-building programmes.  
 
However, Arrighi argues that America entered a hegemonic crisis from the late 1960s as 
failure in the Vietnam War, widespread anti-systemic politics, and a growing financial 
crisis undermined America’s ability to either lead or coerce other states. (Arrighi, 2005; 
Arrighi, 2010). As this crisis states improved their economic and diplomatic power 
relative to the West – further undermining American hegemony and creating 
“simultaneously a crisis of profitability and of legitimacy” (Arrighi, 2002, p. 17). In 
1979 the United States responded to this hegemonic crisis through the introduction of 
neoliberal policies in American and global financial institutions, which redirected 
capital flows back into America. The consequences of these policies included “a severe 
contraction in money supply, higher interest rates, lower taxes for the wealthy, and 
virtually unrestricted freedom of action for capitalist enterprise” (Arrighi, Silver & 
Brewer, 2003, p. 20). However, although this response stalled US hegemonic decline it 
produced a global recession by increasing interest rates, thus raising the debt-burden on 
loan-dependant developing states (Arrighi, 2002, p. 33). These policies culminated in a 
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‘debt crisis’ among many third world countries, forcing them to acquire emergency IMF 
loans under new neo-liberal pre-conditions such as dismantling industrial protections, 
replacing public with private enterprises and devaluating local currency (Arrighi, 2002, 
p. 7). The results of these ‘structural adjustment programs’ included declining economic 
growth, widespread unplanned urbanisation, increased corruption, escalating social and 
economic inequality, and loss of domestic industries in African countries such as Sudan, 
whose pastoral economy was severely damaged (Elhadary & Samat, 2012, p. 214).  
 
The policies pursued by the US treasury, World Bank and IMF were instrumental in re-
establishing the conditions for capital accumulation, restoring American wealth, power 
and prestige and rolling back Third World power (Arrighi, 2005, p. 20; Hahn, 2008, p. 
144). However, Arrighi argues that this revival in US wealth and power accompanied 
the ‘financialisation’ of capital, or the “systemwide shift away from investment in trade 
and production and toward financial speculation and intermediation” (Silver & Arrighi, 
2011, p. 54). Thus, although the 1980s and 1990s are characterised as an American 
‘belle époque’, Arrighi argues that financialisation of the US economy during this 
period signalled a mounting crisis in American hegemony (Arrighi & Silver, 1999, p. 
272; Arrighi, 2005). Furthermore, Arrighi argues that this crisis only deepened 
following the US unilateral decision to invade Iraq, which not only jeopardised the 
credibility of US military might
5
 and its capacity to lead, but “further undermined the 
centrality of the United States and the US dollar in the global political economy” 
(Arrighi, 2005, p. 1). Whereas the Vietnam war created the ‘signal’ crisis of US 
hegemony, Arrighi argues that the failed US attempt to dominate global oil supplies 
through its invasion of Iraq signalled the ‘terminal’ crisis, noting that “the Bush 
Administration’s bid for global supremacy is most likely to go down in history as one of 
the several ‘bubbles’ to have punctuated the terminal crisis of US hegemony” (Arrighi, 
2005, p. 80). In addition, the US occupation of Iraq has also strengthened Chinese 
leadership as a credible alternative to US hegemony, as Arrighi notes “while the US was 
bogged down in Iraq, China continued to grow at a rapid pace, acquiring financial 
                                                        
5
 The restructuring of the US military following the Vietnam war in combination with 
significant technological improvements in US armaments transformed the US military 
into a far more efficient fighting force by 2003. Thus, the US failure to overcome local 
resistance in Iraq, despite a much greater disparity of forces between the US and local 
militia “definitively confirmed the earlier verdict of the Vietnam War- that is, that the 
Western superiority of force has reached its limits and shows strong tendencies towards 
implosion” (Arrighi, 2007, p. 9; Arrighi, 2005). 
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reserves and friends throughout the world as quickly as the United States was losing 
them” (Arrighi, 2010, p. 385)6.  
 
Arrighi also contends that the Iraq debacle, in combination with “China’s spectacular 
economic advance since the 1990s,” has increased “the probability that we will witness 
the formation of an East Asian-centered world-market society” (Arrighi, 2007, p. 8, 7). 
Following the adoption of an ‘open door’ policy to international investment and trade in 
the 1970s China has emerged as a rising economic power with an average annual 
growth rate of around 10% over the last 30 years and an economy second only in size to 
America (Marks, 2010). Furthermore, data from UNCTAD (2008) shows that China 
attracted US$92.4 billion in FDI in 2008 alone whilst also increasing outward foreign 
direct investment by almost 55 percent a year between 2002-2007 (Sae, 2011, p. 162, 
167). As such, Harvey argues that China, with its focus on ‘long-term infrastructure 
investment’ seems the most promising location for a successful ‘spatio-temporal fix’ to 
the over-accumulation crisis, that is, for absorbing over-accumulated capital
7
:  
Since 1998, the Chinese have sought to absorb their vast labour 
surpluses... by debt-financed investment in huge mega-projects that 
dwarf the already huge Three Gorges dam… This effort…has the 
potential to absorb surpluses of capital for several years to come. 
(Arrighi, 2005, p. 39) 
 
The global implications of this ‘spatial fix’ include a major shift of the global 
economy’s centre of gravity from North America to East Asia, and China’s 
displacement of the US as the regional hegemon (Arrighi, 2005; Arrighi, 2001; Hahn, 
2008). In addition, China is also challenging US hegemony by promoting its 
increasingly strong yuan as an alternative to the US dollar in oil transactions, as Winter 
                                                        
6
 Following the end of the cold war and the transformation of the Organisation of 
African Unity into the African Union (AU), China aligned itself with the AU in 
rebuilding infrastructure in war-torn countries such as Angola and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. In fact, Campbell notes that “the historic meeting between the 
Chinese leaders and representatives of 48 governments in Africa took place in the 
Chinese capital in November 2006, at the same time that USA was bogged down in a 
fiasco in Iraq” (2008, p. 92). 
7
 As a result of the intensification of competition across the globe, successful capital 
accumulation tends to undermine the “monopolistic privileges attached to specific 
locations”, thereby causing capital to accumulate “over and above what can be 
profitably reinvested in the production and exchange of commodities within existing 
territorial systems” (Arrighi, 2005, p. 36). The opening up of new spaces for capital 
accumulation temporarily ‘fixes’ this crisis through absorbing surplus capital. 
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notes “Russia, Iran, Angola, Sudan and Venezuela have converted oil sales to China 
into the Chinese yuan… more than 5 million barrels per day [are] traded in yuan rather 
than U.S. dollars” (Winter, 2013). China is also challenging US hegemony through its 
aggressive pursuit of energy deals in the Middle East with major energy producing 
countries, as Campbell notes “Saudi Arabia and small Gulf States such as Iran, are 
independently shifting the oil trade to China away from the US” (2008, p. 97). 
 
China has also been incredibly successful in establishing good relations with African 
countries based on ‘mutual’ economic gain resulting in a booming trade between China 
and Africa
8
. Whereas America has a tarnished reputation in many parts of Africa due to 
the negative impacts of US-backed policies, China is widely perceived as a peaceful 
rising power “trying its best to please, assist, [and] accommodate its neighbours” (Perlez 
cited in Arrighi, 2005, p. 77)
9
. In addition, as a result of the popularity of China’s 
interest-free long-term loans and lack of conditionalities (except for recognising the 
‘one-China’ principle), African leaders are increasingly looking to China for “trade, aid 
and political alliances, shaking up the continent’s historical links” and undermining US 
hegemony (Arrighi, Silver & Brewer, 2003, p. 78). China’s provision of loans with few 
political conditions and interest in developing African infrastructure has also decreased 
third world debt and consequently reduced the capacity of the IMF and other Northern-
controlled financial institutions to influence global economic policy (Arrighi, 2007, p. 
382).
10
 
 
The importance China has placed on enhancing South-South co-operation through trade, 
investment and diplomacy is also an integral part of what authors such as Taylor view 
as a concerted and sustained effort by China over the past 50 years to “contain the 
influence of hegemonic powers and also to carve out a rightful place for China in the 
world” (cited in Power and Mohan, 2010, p. 477). As such, China has played a leading 
                                                        
8
 “In 2003 alone, China-Africa trade increased nearly 50 percent to $18.5 billion” 
(Arrighi, 2005, p. 78) 
9
 “In the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey… respondents in ten African countries 
expressed far more favourable attitudes towards China than they did towards the United 
States” (Jacques, 2009, p. 332) 
10
 Commentators such as Jacques have noted that “China’s arrival as an alternative 
source of trade, aid and investment has created a competitive environment for African 
states… [and broken dependency] on Western nations, the IMF and the World Bank” 
(2009, p. 327). 
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role in redirecting the world’s surplus from the US financial ‘entrepot’ to other Southern 
destinations through trade and aid, thereby undermining US hegemony (Arrighi, 2007, 
p. 382).
11
 Deepening Chinese relations with African regimes condemned by the US and 
Western nations in the UN, such as Sudan, also weakens America’s coercive power and 
undermines its capacity to rule and lead, which has already declined following the US 
occupation of Iraq (Arrighi, 2005). However, it should also be noted that China only 
indirectly challenges US hegemony as Chinese economic growth and hence the survival 
of the CCP is deeply dependent on both US support for China’s economic growth and 
access to the US export market (Shirk, 2008, p. 28). As such, Arrighi’s understandings 
of China and Africa in the current world-system positions Sino-Sudanese engagement 
within the context of declining American hegemony, rising Chinese power, and the 
legacy of US neoliberal reform on African economic development. Thus, this 
theoretical framework is well-suited to an analysis of Sino-African relations, as Sudan 
was also subjected to IMF structural adjustment but rejected it in favour of its own 
programme largely financed by Chinese capital (Elhadary & Samat, 2012, p. 214).  
  
                                                        
11
 South-South flows increased from $4.6 billion in 1994 to an average of $54.4 billion 
between 1997 and 2000 (Aseyehgn, 2009). 
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Chapter Two: China and Africa 
 
This chapter situates Sino-Sudanese relations within the wider context of Sino-
African relations, analysing China’s general motivations for expanding its 
engagement with the continent. Furthermore, this chapter will consider what insights 
Sino-African relations provide regarding core-periphery relations and the themes of 
declining US hegemony, the economic rise of China and its potential hegemonic 
challenge. Thus, this chapter’s analysis of the China-Africa relationship integrated into 
Arrighi’s interpretation of World-Systems Theory provides the backdrop to Sino-
Sudanese relations which will be explored in chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Literature on China and Africa 
In describing the changing relationship between China and Africa Campbell (2008) 
quotes Gramsci, ‘the old is dying yet the new is yet to be born’, noting that “Chinese 
relations with Africa combine elements of the old (extraction of raw materials), yet the 
experience of transformation in China ensues that there are many positive and negative 
lessons to be learnt” (p. 89). Since the early establishment of Sino-African relations in 
the late 1950s, China has developed from marginal actor to influential player on the 
continent. Official Chinese Communist Party (CCP) documents divide economic and 
trading relations with Africa into three distinct periods: 1949-1978, 1979-1994, and 
1995 to the present, with the emphasis shifting from ideological and diplomatic 
engagement to more pragmatic economic and commercial interests (Campbell, 2008, p. 
93). Although literature on Sino-African relations during the 1990s was extremely 
scarce, China’s sustained economic growth and its deepening engagement with Africa 
has spurred a proliferation of analyses of China’s motivations and impacts on the 
continent (Large, 2008). The expanding literature on Sino-African relations reflects 
some concerns regarding this deepening engagement, ranging from “control over energy 
resources to exploitive economic practices and support of rogue or corrupt regimes, 
perpetuating instability and undermining international pressure for reform” (Hofstedt, 
2009, p. 79).  
 
Many Western commentators and analysts such as Pant (2008), Halper (2010) and Scott 
(2008) are critical of Chinese involvement in African countries, labelling Chinese 
foreign policy self-serving and neo-colonialist, and Sino-African economic relations as 
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fundamentally unequal. These authors also argue that China promotes harmful 
environmental practices, fosters corruption, and undermines IMF efforts to enhance 
transparency and combat poverty. However, many Africans view China favourably 
compared to the US and, given the failure of the IMF’s Structural Adjustment 
Programs, view China’s state-supported model of growth as an attractive alternative to 
neo-liberal policy prescriptions (Jacques, 2009). Relatively even-handed analyses of 
Sino-African diplomatic and economic engagement include texts such as: Raine, 
China’s African Challenges (2009); Jakobson, “China’s Diplomacy toward Africa: 
Drivers and constraints” (2009); Alden, China in Africa (2007); Power and Mohan, 
“Towards a Critical Geopolitics of China’s Engagement with African Development” 
(2010); and Tull “China’s engagement in Africa: scope, significance and consequences” 
(2006). In addition, given the importance of energy security to the CCP, some texts deal 
specifically with China’s energy relations with African countries such as: Currier and 
Dorraj, “China’s energy relations with the developing world” (2011); Hanson, “China, 
Africa, and Oil” (2008); and Hong, “China’s energy relations with Africa” (2011). 
These texts generally view energy concerns as determinative in China’s Africa strategy, 
although “Chinese interest in Africa extends beyond oil… [to] non-oil commodities 
such as timber, copper, and diamonds” along with expanding trade (Hanson, 2008, p. 2).  
 
Many texts analysing Sino-African relations are directly situated within the context of 
declining American hegemony and rising Chinese power, such as: Yi-Chong, “China 
and the United States in Africa: Coming conflict or commercial coexistence?” (2008); 
Bachman, “‘Kick down the door, clean up the mess, and rebuild the house’- the Africa 
Command and transformation of the US military” (2010); Birchmeier, “China in Africa: 
Implications for the United States” (2010); Campbell, “China in Africa: Challenging US 
global hegemony” (2008); Foot and Walter, China, the United States, and Global Order 
(2011); and Hofstedt “China in Africa: An AFRICOM response” (2009). These texts 
analyse the consequences of deepening Sino-African relations for the US and generally 
argue that, though China poses no military threat, its expanding economic and 
diplomatic engagement undermine American influence. Critical interpretations of China 
as a neo-colonialist power, or as a competitor with domestic African industry which 
undermines development, also abound among Western commentators such as Pant 
(2008), Halper (2010) and Scott (2008). However, articles such as Marks, Chinese and 
African Perspectives on China in Africa (2010), reflect positive African perspectives on 
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Sino-African relations, whilst commentary such as Friedman, “How economic 
superpower China could transform Africa” (2010) present China as a development 
partner whose economic engagement benefits Africa overall. Furthermore, texts such as 
“China’s South-South Cooperative Investments part II” (Aseyehgn, 2009) and “China’s 
Africa policy: South-South unity and co-operation” (Yu, 2010) analyse relations 
between the China and various developing countries, noting that Chinese investment has 
increased South-South cash flows, and contributed greatly to rising growth rates in 
Africa (Aseyehgn, 2009).  
 
China’s interests in Africa 
Western interpretations of China’s activity in Africa largely view China as neo-realist 
world power “actively expanding its influence in Africa to secure supplies of natural 
resources, to counter Western political and economic influence while expanding 
China’s global influence” (Brooks and Shin, 2006, p. 1). However, although China’s 
theatre-level strategic objectives include “ensuring access to natural resources, 
expanding export markets, enhancing China’s prestige as a rising global power, and 
protecting its international freedom of action”, these objectives are driven by the need 
for robust economic growth and social stability (Hofstedt, 2009, p. 85). Furthermore, 
China’s phenomenal growth over the last 30 years has consolidated the middle class and 
created a class of ‘nouveau riche’ “who clamor for the amenities of modern life, most 
significant among them, private housing and automobiles” (Currier & Dorraj, 2011, p. 
7). Thus, China’s domestic economic reform significantly altered its policy towards 
Africa from “primarily political and symbolic considerations to a focus on more 
pragmatic political, economic and social objectives” (Yu, 2010, p. 133), including 
acquiring energy resources, opening additional markets for export, and sustaining 
African political support in global institutions such as the UN(Jakobson, 2009, p. 410; 
Birchmeier, 2010, p. 7).  
 
The importance of securing energy resources for China cannot be overstated, as 
sustaining economic growth is central to the CCP’s regime survival (Cornelius & Story, 
2007, p. 6). China’s drive to diversify energy sources follows from its transition to a net 
oil importer in 1993, the diminishing output from Chinese oilfields such as Daqing, and 
its inability to satisfy import demand from the Asia-Pacific region (Human Rights 
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Watch, 2003, p. 457; Hong, 2011, p. 106).
12
 China’s trade with developing counties has 
also grown 88 percent faster than trade with the developed world (Carmody & Taylor, 
2010, p. 496), with Sino-African trade increasing by around 30 percent annually since 
2002 (reaching $US114.8 billion in 2010 despite the financial crisis) and largely 
balancing Chinese imports raw commodities (Sutter, 2012, p.319).Another notable 
Chinese interest in Africa is enhancing its food security as, despite being the world’s 
leading grain producer, it only possesses 7 percent of the world’s arable land (Raine, 
2009, p. 41; Xinhua, 2008, July 4). This is further compounded by the Chinese 
population’s changing dietary demands, and the steady exhaustion of water supplies 
beneath their fertile northern plains (Raine, 2009, p. 41; Richardson, 2008, August 14). 
The CCP has thus begun actively encouraging Chinese companies to buy African 
farmland, and shown increased interest in agricultural cooperation at FOCAC summits 
(Raine, 2009, p. 41).  
 
Following from its increased economic and diplomatic influence on the continent, China 
now has greater capacity to mobilise African support in international institutions, such 
as the UN. According to China’s African Policy, China is willing to “coordinate 
positions on major international and regional issues and stand for mutual support on 
major issues concerning state sovereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity, and 
human rights” for any African state which respects the One-China principle (Hofstedt, 
2009, p. 87). China has thus been highly successful in enlisting African support at the 
United Nations. This African support for China has been crucial in blocking eleven UN 
condemnations of Chinese human rights abuses, helping China win the bid for the 2008 
Olympic games and stopping Taiwan from joining the World Health Organisation 
(Alden, 2007, p. 22; Hofstedt, 2009, p. 87). The combination of China’s position on the 
UN Security Council, and co-operation with African states in the General assembly, 
allows China to more effectively oppose UN penalties for abusive states like Sudan - 
undermining America’s institutional capability to ‘lead’ and ‘coerce’, and thus 
weakening US hegemony. China’s use of African allies to isolate Taiwan and gain 
support for its notion of national sovereignty as inviolable is also in their national 
interest, as assertiveness regarding Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity helps 
                                                        
12
 China’s interest in African oil is also motivated by China’s perception of oil 
partnerships in Southeast Asia as deeply entrenched between US, Japan and Europe, and 
concerns about the instability of oil producing regions in the Middle East and Central 
Asia resulting from the War on Terror. (Hong, 2011, p. 106). 
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stoke Chinese nationalism, foster national unity, and maintain the dominance of the 
CCP (Mendes & Nascimento, 2009, p. 1-6). 
 
Complementing the strategic goals of securing resources and export markets is the 
projection of China as a “peacefully rising, constructive, and responsible major power” 
(Jakobson, 2009, p. 405) which is “simply interested in becoming fully integrated in the 
ascendant institutions of the global economy and global governance” (Currier & Dorraj, 
2011, p. 3). Attempts to portray China as a non-threatening rising power began in the 
early 2000s when China’s economic rise was escalating concerns among its regional 
neighbours, with Pant arguing that “China’s recent emphasis on projecting its rise as 
peaceful is merely aimed at allaying the concerns of its neighbours lest they try to 
counter-balance its growing influence” (2008, p. 34). China enhances this image in 
Africa through considerable development aid, providing US$1.3 billion in debt relief to 
27 countries from 2000 to 2003, and cancelling the equivalent in debt in 2006, whilst 
also contributing significantly to the African Development Bank (Hofstedt, 2009, p. 80-
81).
13
 China’s commitment to behaving as a responsible world power was further 
emphasised after the 2009 global financial crisis, when despite declining economic 
growth, exports and imports, China “pledged to honor its aid commitments… [whilst] 
also encourage[ing]… Chinese domestic firms to invest abroad, even issuing a 
guidebook for overseas investments” (Yu, 2010, p. 140). In addition, the lack of 
conditionalities on Chinese loans is seen by many Africans as respecting African states’ 
sovereignty in comparison to intrusive Western loan schemes, as Liu Guijin, China’s 
special representative to Africa, noted in 2008 in a speech in Khartoum:  
We [China] have never, and will never in the future, attach any kind of 
political conditions to these aid and development projects, because we 
think that providing assistance is just for the benefit of the people, it is 
not for political purposes, not for showing off to the outside world. (Cited 
in Xinhua News, 2008, February 26) 
  
                                                        
13
 China has supported its diplomatic relations with African through a number of ‘good 
will’ projects, as Alden notes “In addition to new public buildings serving the needs of 
politicians and bureaucrats in African capitals, these same construction firms were 
building dozens of hospitals and schools” (2007, p. 4) 
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China and Africa: Diplomacy 
The shape of modern Sino-African relations was forged during the decolonisation 
period from 1950 to the early 1970s in the context of expanding co-operation between 
developing countries in the fight against colonialism. The 1955 Asian-African 
‘Bandung’ Conference was an important step towards the formation of the Non-Aligned 
Movement in 1961 and a ‘psychological milestone’ in purging the “lingering sense of 
inferiority” (Larkin, 1971, p. 28) felt by developing countries, becoming a “symbol of 
Afro-Asia as a viable political concept” (Power & Mohan, 2010, p. 476). The guiding 
principles governing Sino-African relations can be traced to the ‘five principles of 
pancheela’ established between China and India at Bandung: “respect for territorial 
integrity; non-aggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and 
mutual benefit in relations; and peaceful coexistence” (Power and Mohan, 2010, p. 476-
477; Jones, 2005, p. 851). During the 1980s China’s focus on internal reforms led to a 
decline in Sino-African trade and aid, with diplomatic visits becoming infrequent (Yi-
Chong, 2008, p. 23; Asayehgn, 2009). However, continued African support for China 
following the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, which spurred Western powers to 
isolate China, led to the expansion of Sino-African diplomacy throughout the 1990s 
(Jakobson, 2009, p. 408).  
 
China’s strategic interest in accessing energy resources to sustain rapid economic 
growth, especially once China became a net oil importer in 1993, spurred an escalation 
of Chinese trade and investment throughout Africa (Yi-Chong, 2008; Hanson, 2008). 
Although US-Africa trade was estimated at around US$71.1 billion in 2006 in 
comparison to China-Africa trade at US$50.5 billion, Sino-African trade is growing 
rapidly, and China’s economic growth and huge foreign currency reserves place it in an 
ever-improving position to outcompete other countries on the international oil market 
(Jacques, 2009, pp. 325; Hofstedt, 2009, p. 85-86). However, despite China’s inroads 
into the African market, they continue to purchase far less of Africa’s oil than the US 
and Europe (12 percent versus 31 percent each respectively in 2007), and Sino-African 
trade still pales in comparison to China’s trade with the US, Japan, the EU and South 
Korea (Jakobson, 2009, p. 410). 
 
China’s expanded role in African politics is reflected in its extensive use of bilateral 
committees and political consultation among foreign ministries during negotiations, and 
C34: Bachelor of Arts Honours 
Benjamin Hale, ID Number 10161199 23 
through institutions such as the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) and the 
African Union (AU) (Hong, 2011, p. 120). The first FOCAC summit held in 2000 
assembled representatives from 45 African countries in Beijing to discuss expanding 
Sino-African economic and political co-operation, at which China pledged to increase 
African foreign aid and write off around US$1.2 billion in debt (Chi-Kwan, 2012, p. 
132). China further consolidated Sino-African diplomacy through labelling 2006 as 
‘China’s Year of Africa’ in commemoration of 50 years of diplomatic relations, which it 
supported through personal, high-level diplomatic overtures such as extensive tours by 
Chinese president Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao and another FOCAC summit in 
November 2006 (Jakobson, 2009, p. 408; Hofstedt, 2009, p. 80). Furthermore, China 
confirmed its role as a constructive and important African partner through its active 
engagement with the African Union in summits in 2006 and 2007 in which it pledged 
$100 to $150 million towards the construction of a permanent AU headquarters 
(Hofstedt, 2009, p. 80-81).
14
  
 
China’s historical links with Africa and anti-colonial struggles have deeply shaped 
current China-Africa relations, with China the “self-proclaimed champion of the 
developing world” at international institutions such as the UN where it “give[s] a voice 
to less-developed countries in institutions largely dominated by Western interests” 
(Currier & Dorraj, 2011, p. 4). China emphasises these anti-colonial links to legitimise 
their emerging commercial interests, garner support for Chinese initiatives and position 
Sino-African relations as an alternative to relations with the West (Power and Mihan, 
2010, p. 475-476).
15
 For example, during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s tour of Africa 
in 2006 he emphasised that “the Chinese nation knows too well the suffering caused by 
colonial rule and the need to fight colonialism. This is one of the main reasons why we 
have supported the national liberation and resurgence of Africa” (People’s Daily, 2006, 
November 3). China’s position on human rights is also explicitly framed with reference 
to previous Western colonial abuses of China and the African continent, as Anshan 
                                                        
14
 However, it should be noted that China continues to primarily drive the FOCAC 
process, meaning that “Budgets tend to be allocated to individual countries in 
accordance with priorities determined in Beijing, which often bear little relation to the 
needs and economic realities on the ground” (Raine, 2009, p. 81). 
15
 Jakobson (2009) notes that “In articles by Chinese academics and observers about 
China’s relationship with Africa, a predominant theme is the common heritage of 
struggling to eradicate poverty and colonialism which China and African nations share” 
(p. 405). 
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notes “talking about abuse of human rights… it is almost shameful for these countries to 
accuse China of human rights abuses, when they have committed much more atrocious 
acts in the past” (cited in Power and Mohan, 2010, p. 482). Thus, China emphasises its 
historical connections with Africa and the shared history of colonialism through state-
to-state diplomacy to strengthen Sino-African relations, challenge Western norms and, 
by providing an alternative to Western frameworks, undermine US capacity to ‘lead’ 
African states. 
 
China and Africa: Trade 
Chinese officials eagerly emphasise the complementary nature of Sino-African relations 
noting that “Africa is short of investment capital, has a low manufacturing base, and is 
highly import-dependent. China can easily make capital, manufactured goods and 
markets available” (Yi-Chong, 2008, p. 27). However, while Chinese and African 
leaders maintain that their countries are “equal partners in the developing world”, many 
commentators view the relationship as “deeply unequal” (Jakobson, 2009, p. 406; 
Clapham, 2006, p. 363). China’s economy dwarfs the economies of Africa, and the 
disparity is only increasing, as Jakobson notes “excluding South Africa, there is no 
African economy that can even begin to engage with China in the way that China is 
engaging with Africa” (2009, p. 406). Despite the rapid growth in Sino-African trade in 
recent years, escalating from US$5 billion in 1995 to US$10 billion in 2003 and over 
US$100 billion in 2008, trade between China and the African constituted less than 5 per 
cent of China’s overall foreign trade in 2008 (Yu, 2010, p. 140). Furthermore, the 
configuration of China’s relationship with African countries is overwhelmingly based 
on China’s needs rather than any mutually developed China-Africa policy, as Jakobson 
notes “African nations have no real plan as to how to maximize the relationship with 
China for Africa’s long-term development” (2009, p. 406). This asymmetrical Sino-
African relationship reflects Arrighi’s understandings of core-periphery relations as an 
exploitative process, whereby the overwhelming economic strength of core powers such 
as China, compared to peripheral countries in Africa, enables them to structure 
relationships entirely in service of their own interests. 
 
Although Chinese government officials stress the ‘complimentary’ nature of Sino-
African economic engagement, the overall structure of exports of African oil and 
primary commodities and imports of Chinese manufactured goods now concerns 
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Western commentators and African leaders alike.
16
 Sino-African trade is concentrated 
among a small number of resource-rich countries whose exports consist of either raw 
materials and/or oil, with South Africa, Sudan, Angola, and Nigeria constituting over 75 
percent of Sino-African trade. While pro-China authors such as Wang and Bio-Tchane 
argue that “the similar composition of goods traded… largely reflects the comparative 
advantages of each partner, given their stage of economic development” (Cited in 
Hofstedt, 2009, p. 81), Western commentators such as Tull (2006) view China’s Africa 
policy as “essentially mercantilist in nature” (Cited in Pant, 2008, p. 37). Following the 
closure of local textile mills under the onslaught of cheap Chinese imports, Moeletsi 
Mbeki, deputy chairman of the South Africa Institute of International Affairs, stated 
“Africa sells raw materials to China and China sells manufactured products to Africa. 
This is a dangerous equation that reproduces Africa’s old relationship with colonial 
powers” (cited in Jacques, 2009, p. 330).  
 
Thus, the exchange of commodities between China and Africa not only reflects Africa’s 
historic relationships with Western powers but also the fundamental inequality of 
commodity exchange between the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’. Demand for primary 
commodities such as oil and minerals from the periphery is growing alongside demand 
for industrial goods produced in the ‘core’ in contradiction to the expectations of 
World-System theorists that demand for industrial goods would outpace demand for 
primary commodities (Isaak, 1991, p. 88). However, core countries derive more benefits 
from this exchange due to their position in the world-system as increases in productivity 
in core nations creates constant “upward pressure on wages and other input costs, 
keeping…[the price of manufactured goods] constant or pushing them up”, whilst 
productivity increases in peripheral countries “do not translate into wage increases or 
constant prices given weak labor organizations and disguised unemployment” (Isaak, 
1991, p. 89). In addition, increasing economic disparity between China and African 
states is largely the result of the intensely competitive environment fostered by the 
success of many African countries in industrializing, which reduces the advantages 
afforded to each state in advancing economically in relation to each other. (Arrighi, 
Silver and Brewer, 2003, p. 19). 
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 Despite recent growth in Chinese imports of African manufactured goods, oil still 
constitutes over 80 percent of African exports, followed by other African commodities 
such as timber, copper and diamonds, with manufactured goods comprising less than 10 
percent (Yu, 2010, p. 140; Zafar, 2007, p. 115-116). 
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The spread of small Chinese retailers in the wake of large State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs), also faces growing criticism among African populations who argue that “These 
supporting networks frequently undermine the local economy and drive out traditional 
suppliers with low-cost, low-quality goods” (Halper, 2010, p. 120). The number of 
Chinese nationals working or living for a prolonged period of time in Africa has grown 
remarkable in recent years, reaching 750,000 in 2007 (Raine, 2009, p. 26). Although the 
majority of this population is employed by Chinese corporations, this figure also reflects 
the growing number of small entrepreneurs and traders who migrate or travel to Africa, 
utilising networks and supply chains back to China to outcompete local competition 
(Alden, 2007, p. 43; Aseyehgn, 2009). Another key concern among international 
commentators is China fostering corruption among its African partners through its 
negligent attitude towards “matters of resource transparency and mechanisms of 
oversight” (Zafar, 2007, p. 106). The lack of transparency concerning the allocation, 
effectiveness and overall amount of Chinese aid is criticised by authors such as 
Lancaster (2007) who notes that “the volume of Chinese aid is often regarded as a state 
secret” (cited in Power and Mohan, 2010, p. 483).17  
 
China and Africa: Investment and Aid 
Chinese investment throughout Africa is fundamentally driven by domestic 
development interests, primarily the need to secure raw materials and energy resources. 
Although China funds infrastructure projects in 35 African countries (such as dams, 
railways and roads), around 70 percent of Chinese aid is directed towards four resource 
rich countries: Sudan, Nigeria, Angola, and Ethiopia (Foster, Butterfield, Chen & 
Pushak, 2008, p. vi). Powerful Chinese institutions such as the Export-Import Bank of 
China (EXIM Bank), the China Development Bank (CDB), and the China-Africa 
Development Fund (CADF) are at the forefront of China’s push to enhance trade and 
diplomaccy with resource-rich countries (Raine, 2009, p. 72-74). Thus, the 
overwhelming majority of Chinese aid in Africa appears to be aimed towards 
“smoothing the transit of resources for export… or towards providing infrastructure in 
                                                        
17
 However, it should also be noted that whereas Western aid is usually assigned to 
national budgets, Chinese aid is usually “assigned to designated projects…. [mostly] 
infrastructure related… and is therefore harder to siphon off” (Power and Mohan, 2010, 
p. 484). 
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accordance with the host-government agendas in return for licenses for mines and oil 
blocs” (Raine, 2009, p. 42-43). 
 
Chinese aid has assisted the acceptance of wider Chinese investment in African states, 
with its lack of conditions seen as respecting African sovereignty and avoiding lengthy 
negotiations (Hofstedt, 2009, p. 82). This aid is an important element in China’s bid to 
establish itself as an alternative to the West, “whose aid is also perceived as frequently 
paternalistic and as tending to impose Western values” (Hofstedt, 2009, p. 82). 
However, China’s indifference to human rights, civil liberties and democratic 
governance has led to soured relations with some African populations and “a widening 
gap in China’s popularity between popular and official levels in Africa” (Halper, 2010, 
p. 120).
18
 China has also met with severe criticism from the World Bank and IMF who 
argue that China’s unrestricted lending undermines Western attempts to increase 
accountability, fight corruption and ‘repair’ African economies (Yi-Chong, 2008, p. 30). 
Furthermore, China’s willingness to engage and support dictatorial regimes in countries 
such as Sudan and Zimbabwe not only hurts China’s international image but 
compromises China’s long-term interest of being seen as a responsible world power and 
constructive African partner (Scott, 2008, p. 85, 104). Thus, while ‘unconditionality’ 
and non-interference in internal affairs are pillars of China’s foreign policy in Africa, 
and are also important factors in challenging US hegemony and Western norms, the 
untenability of maintaining this position is becoming increasingly apparent given 
China’s vested interest in long-term stability in Africa (Karumbidza, 2007, p. 100-101). 
 
Despite the ‘unconditionality’ of Chinese aid and its commitment to non-interference in 
African national affairs, China’s position “at the forefront of Africa’s political scene” 
has made non-interference untenable, as demonstrated through China’s increased 
willingness to support peacekeeping operations (Holslag, 2009, p. 33). This is also 
evident in the official explanation of China’s support for a French draft resolution for 
intervention in Chad in 2007; “our support for the resolution on Chad shows… that our 
awareness on the increasing complexity of violent conflicts in Africa grows” (Holslag, 
2009, p. 31). Furthermore, China has deployed non-combat support personnel for 
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 For example, a candidate in Zambia’s 2007 presidential election ran on a platform of 
forcibly removing China from the Zambian economy as a result of ill-treatment at 
Chinese mines and poor remuneration (Pant, 2008, p. 38). 
C34: Bachelor of Arts Honours 
Benjamin Hale, ID Number 10161199 28 
initiatives such as the joint United-Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID) and a number of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, suggesting a 
conscious policy of “demonstrat[ing]… support for Africa without appearing militarily 
threatening” (Hofstedt, 2009, p. 84). In fact, the scale of China’s financial support for 
AU peacekeeping missions and military support for UN peacekeeping operations
19
 
reflects China’s growing desire to be seen as a responsible power and, through its 
trumping of US personnel numbers, its commitment to multilateralism. 
 
Though China is largely expanding its trade in Africa through transnational companies 
(TNCs), these companies are often motivated as much by commercial interests as 
foreign policy considerations. Despite escalating levels of official development 
assistance (ODA) to Africa from $US310 million in 1989-92 to $US1-1.5 billion in 
2004-2005, the ratio of ODA to trade has plummeted from 20 to 3-4 percent, resulting 
in decreased government influence and the growing primacy of TNCs (Hofstedt, 2009, 
p. 90). Furthermore, although Chinese TNCs were of paramount importance to China’s 
‘going out’ policy, the internationalisation of these companies has made it increasingly 
difficult for the CCP to constrain their behaviour overseas (Power and Mohan, 2010, p. 
484). In addition, many TNCs such as Petro-China are supported by very powerful 
interest groups making them stronger than the government agencies tasked with 
regulating them, while as Hanson notes, “China’s oversight agencies - including the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce - do not have authority over 
Chinese corporations overseas” (Hanson, 2008, p. 3). Despite the belief among Chinese 
leaders that Chinese corporations overseas improve oil security, many do not put 
national interests over commercial imperatives, often selling most of their oil on the 
global market for higher profits.
20
 Furthermore, commentators such as Xin Ma and 
Phillip Andrews-Speed argue that the Chinese government is doing very little to 
encourage the expansion of SOEs overseas, stating “in most cases, there is little 
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 Between January and August 2010 China committed between 1995-2137 personnel 
per month to peacekeeping operations in Africa, exceeding the level of support of any 
other permanent member of the UN security council. During this period Chinese 
personnel accounted for 1.97-2.13 percent of total UN forces, beating out France which 
committed between 1.61-2 percent, and representing far more than Russia, the UK and 
the US combined (UN Peacekeeping, 2010; Lee, Chan & Chan, 2011, p. 424). 
20
 Representatives of the powerful NOC Sinopec note that “only around 1 per cent of 
their own particular external oil purchases go back to China, with most of it instead 
traded on the international market” (Scott, 2008, p. 65; Lee, Chan & Chan, 2011, p. 
431). 
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evidence to suggest that the government is doing [anything] other than support an 
initiative led by the NOC, develop associated economic activities and provide a 
coordination role” (cited in Zweig, 2010, p. 44).  
 
‘The Beijing Consensus’: Undermining US Hegemony 
China’s sustained economic growth, willingness to engage ‘unconditionally’ with 
African nations and emergence as, according to Arrighi, “the true winner of the… War 
on Terror” has resulted in the advent of what Ramo dubs ‘The Beijing Consensus’ 
(Arrighi, 2007, p. 379; Scott, 2008, p. 83). According to Ramo, China “finds itself now 
not only in possession of the economic tools to help the world, but the tool of its 
example as well” (Ramo, 2004, p. 60) providing “a path for other nations around the 
world…to fit into the international order in a way that allows them to be truly 
independent, to protect their way of life and political choices” (Ramo cited in Arrighi, 
2007, p. 379). In this sense China not only stands as a model for developing states 
throughout Africa that ‘peripheral’ nations can overcome the legacy of colonial 
exploitation,  but promotes a “brand of capitalism and a Chinese conception of the 
international community, both opposed to and substantially different from their Western 
version” (Halper, 2010, p. 3-4). Two features of this ‘consensus’ which are especially 
significant throughout Africa include tailoring development to local needs” and a form 
of multilateralism which recognises “the importance of interstate cooperation in 
constructing a new global order based on economic interdependence but respectful of 
political and cultural differences” (Arrighi, 2007, p. 379). However, many Western 
commentators have been critical of the notion of a ‘Beijing Consensus’ noting that “the 
Consensus as ingested by African state elites is that you can do whatever you like, as 
long as you are open to Chinese trade and investment and support Beijing at 
international fora” (Carmody & Taylor, 2010, p. 511).  
 
 
The willingness of Chinese policymakers to “adapt their strategies to suit the particular 
histories and geographies of the African states with which they engage” has been a 
critical factor in China’s success in forging Sino-African relations (Carmody and 
Taylor, 2010, p. 497; Jakobson, 2009, p. 406). Thus, as per World-Systems Theory, 
through the process of bilateral negotiations between China and African countries, 
influential ‘power blocks’ within the Chinese economy associated with manufacturing 
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are able to establish mutually beneficial relations with complimentary ‘power blocks’ in 
African countries oriented towards resource extraction, or “ tied to the needs of core 
capital” (Chase-Dunn & Rubinson, 1991, p. 38). Furthermore, the flexibility of Chinese 
aid and trade agreements in comparison to World Bank or IMF prescriptions, which can 
threaten the class interests of African elites especially in countries such as Sudan, has 
allowed China to displace US influence throughout many regions of Africa (Arrighi, 
2007). Thus, China’s flexible approach to African relations undermines US hegemony 
through its capability to adapt to national conditions and align complimentary national 
power blocs without the threat of political reform, thereby weakening the economic 
influence of Western financial institutions. 
 
China and Africa: Relations as Beneficial/Harmful 
China’s relationship with Africa has been economically beneficial for much of Africa, 
as Hilsum notes “as a result of intensified trade links with China, Africa has enjoyed 
higher growth rates, better terms of trade, increased export volumes, higher public 
revenues” (cited in Friedman, 2010, p. 140). Despite widespread criticism of China’s 
practices in Africa by Western-dominated institutions, the World Bank begrudgingly 
acknowledged the positive economic impacts of China in Africa in a July 2008 report, 
noting “China’s investments ease Africa’s poverty” (Miller, 2008, July 12). Meanwhile, 
authors such as Jacques have noted that the GDP of Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole has 
risen from 2.6 percent on average in 1999-2001 to around 4.4 percent in 2001-2004, and 
5-6 percent in 2005-6 largely as a result of China’s growing consumption of 
commodities such as oil (2009, p. 327). China’s growing demand for oil accounted for 
18 percent of overall growth in oil demand globally between 2000 and 2005, and 
positively affected the terms of trade for countries rich in oil and/or natural resources 
such as Sudan, Angola, Gabon and Mauritania (Zafar, 2007, p. 111-113). China has also 
had a negative impact on the relative strength of countries which either do not export 
natural resources or are actively competing against Chinese manufactured exports, such 
as South Africa (Jacques, 2009, p. 327). However, the increase in African economic 
growth to as high as 5.8 percent in 2007 is partially the result of Chinese investment 
(Hanson cited in Aseyehgn, 2009). but breaks African dependency on Western loans 
and aid packages, reducing the relative strength of US-controlled institutions to 
influence African policymakers, ultimately eroding its hegemonic position. 
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Chapter Three: Sudan and China 
 
This chapter identifies and analyses key manifestations of China’s relationship with 
Sudan from 1995 onwards with regards to trade, investment and diplomacy. Given 
China’s heavy investment in Sudan’s oil industry and oil-related infrastructure much of 
this chapter explores the Sino-Sudanese oil trade. In addition, this chapter will examine 
the Sino-Sudanese arms trade and China’s important role in undermining UN sanctions, 
as well as the immediate effects of the secession of South Sudan on Sino-Sudanese 
relations. This section’s overall aim is to identify the manifestations of Sino-Sudanese 
trade, aid and diplomacy since 1990, which will then be analysed using Arrighi’s 
understanding’s of World System’s Theory in Chapter Four. 
 
The Changing Nature of Diplomatic Engagement 
Although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may be an ‘old friend’ of Sudan, with 
diplomatic relations dating back to 1959, China has only recently became important for 
Sudan’s foreign relations (Large, 2008, p. 87, 95). Between 1959 and 1989 Chinese 
relations with Sudan remained limited to ‘cordial’ diplomatic relations and minor 
economic involvement, with China only offering its first comparatively small loan and 
aid packages in the 1970s (Shinn, 2009, p. 87). From the early 1990s Sino-Sudanese 
relations developed from limited diplomatic connections and trade in Sudanese cotton to 
more intensive engagement focused on Sudanese oil exports, leading commentators 
such as Deng to classify China as a ‘new actor’ in Sudanese politics (Cited in Large, 
2008, p. 87). These economic relations are now complimented by extensive political 
contact, involving regular tours by leading CCP officials (including former President Hu 
Jintao and former Premier Wen Jiabao), an official ‘cooperative agreement’ betweenthe 
CCP and Sudanese National Congress Party (NCP), and “high-level links between key 
members of the Sudanese and Chinese governing elite and business executives” (Large, 
2007, p. 58). China also evokes shared historical connections fighting colonialism’ 
during the 1950s (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 27).  
 
China’s support of Sudanese interests in global institutions, and willingness to use its 
UN Security Council seat to block or dilute resolutions, was vital in obstructing official 
international condemnation and sanctions against Khartoum (Halper, 2010, p. 100). In 
return, Al-Bashir’s administration favours Chinese construction companies when 
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awarding lucrative contracts and supports China at international forums by publicly 
backing China’s Tibet and Taiwan policies (Shinn, 2009, p. 91). However, China’s 
growing concern about being seen as a responsible rising power together with growing 
criticism of China’s conduct by Western and African commentators, has made China’s 
non-interference policy increasingly untenable. As a result China’s policy towards 
Sudan has undergone slight changes resulting in “the first instance where China actively 
lobbied an African government to permit a UN mission on its soil… via active 
brokering and indirect pressure” (Holslag, 2009, p. 30). 
 
China and Sudan: Investment and Aid 
China’s investment in the Sudanese oil industry during the 1990s completely changed 
the nations’ relationship, converting the fledgling industry into the driving force behind 
Sudan’s remarkable economic growth, and turning Sudan into a net oil exporter. 
Although the American company Chevron initially invested millions of dollars in oil 
exploration projects in Sudan throughout the 1970s, domestic pressure eventually forced 
its withdrawal from the region, which was soon followed by US sanctions (Yi-Ching, 
2008, p. 20). Consequently, the Canadian company Arakis purchased Chevron’s lost 
concessions in 1992, forming the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company 
(GNPOC) in 1996, and thereby providing China with an opportunity to enter the 
Sudanese oil industry (Yi-Chong, 2008, p. 20-21). Initially the consortium was 
established between Arakis, China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), Petronas 
Carigali Overseas Sudan Berhad (a subsidiary of Malaysia’s nationally owned 
petroleum company), and Sudan’s national oil company Sudapet Limited, with China 
owning the largest share of 40 percent”. However, the purchase of Arakis by Talisman 
Energy in 1998 and its consequent withdrawal under increased domestic pressure, left 
the three state-owned companies in charge of operations (Human Rights Watch, 2003, 
p. 47). China complimented its entry into the Sudanese oil industry by employing 
CNPC’s ‘construction arm’, the CPECC (China Petroleum Engineering & Construction 
Corporation, in the establishment of a refinery close to Khartoum, the construction of a 
1500 km pipeline stretching from its oil acquisitions to the Red Sea, and by engaging in 
“10 million tons [of] oilfield surface engineering” (Human Rights Watch, 2003, p. 458-
459).  
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China’s investment in the oil industry only increased during the 2000s as a result of 
both government-led encouragement of SOEs to invest in Sudan (although financial 
incentives were halted in 2007
21
) and the industry’s growing profitability (Lee, Chan & 
Chan, 2011, p. 432). In 2001, China deepened its investment in Sudanese oil by 
acquiring 47 percent ownership over the Petrodar Operating Company through CNPC 
and Sinopec which was tasked with developing blocks 3 and 7, whilst also purchasing 
95 percent of block 6 through CNPC (Large, 2007, p. 59). Although the total value of 
China’s investment in Sudan is difficult to determine, Omer Mohamed Abel Salam, the 
former Sudanese Director General of International Financial Cooperation, Ministry of 
Finance and National Economy, places total Chinese oil investment at around US$4.7 
billion, although it is likely much larger (Shinn, 2009, p. 88). Furthermore, Chinese 
companies are now Sudan’s biggest investors, with between 65 to 82 percent of Sudan’s 
oil exports bound for China (International Monetary Fund, 2008, p. 467). As a 
consequence the number of Chinese workers living or working for prolonged periods of 
time in Sudan, including those involved in the oil industry, increased threefold between 
the early 1990s and 2006 reaching a peak of around 24,000 (Hong, 2011, p. 105). In 
addition, the Chinese government has promoted investment in the oil industry through 
agreements such as that signed in 1995 which provided the CNPC with a preferential 
credit line amounting to 1.15 billion Renminbi for oil exploration projects (Hong, 2011, 
p. 109). 
 
Alongside Chinese investment in the oil industry, Chinese economic cooperation in 
Sudan has grown remarkably with Sudan receiving 46 percent of China’s “net non-
financial overseas direct investment to Africa in 2004” and around 22 percent of 
China’s “accumulated net overseas direct investment to Africa at the end of 2005” 
(Large, 2008, p. 99). Chinese companies have successfully secured contracts for large 
infrastructure projects such as hydro-electric facilities, the Khartoum airport, textile 
plants, the (environmentally deleterious) Merowe and Kajbar dams (Reeves, 2007), “a 
$345 million pipeline that will channel water from the Nile River to Port Sudan, and a 
$325 million water system” (Sutter, 2012, p. 321). Furthermore, Chinese firms have 
constructed much needed infrastructure such as railroads, bridges, and communications 
networks, supplying Sudan with a large amount of information and communication 
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 “Beginning in 2007 China no longer offers financial incentives to its oil companies to 
invest in Sudan” (Lee, Chan & Chan, 2011, p. 432). 
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equipment between 2001 and 2007 (Foster, Butterfield, Chen, & Pushak, 2008, p. vii-
viii). However, much of China’s infrastructure in Sudan is oriented towards facilitating 
oil extraction, including the construction of all-weather roads and airstrips, and the 
Khartoum refinery, in which China has a 50 percent stake (Hong, 2011, p. 105).  
 
China and Sudan: Trade 
Sino-Sudanese trade has also grown remarkably since 1999, as the booming oil based 
economy has resulted in increased demand for Chinese manufactured goods in Sudan 
(Large, 2008, 58). China not only constituted around 75 percent of total Sudanese 
exports, but accounted for 20.8 percent of the Asian share of Sudan’s total imports in 
2006 (Large, 2008, p. 94)
22. China’s role as Sudan’s leading trading partner is 
indisputable with bilateral trade estimated at around US$2.56 billion in 2004, US$3.9 
billion in 2005, and US$5.7 billion in 2007 (Large, 2007, p. 58; Large, 2009, p. 616). 
Furthermore, the IMF calculated that in 2007 alone China imported US$7.3 billion 
worth of commodities (mostly primary) from Sudan, and exported around US$2.4 
billion in manufactured goods, which is around 30 percent of all Sudanese imports 
(International Monetary Fund, 2008, p. 467).  
 
The Sino-Sudanese arms trade is another important component of bilateral trade 
between the two countries which also reflects wider Chinese behaviour in the 
developing world.
23
 China first became a significant source of antipersonnel and 
antitank mines for Sudan in the 1980s, and a major supplier of ammunition, helicopters, 
military aircraft and armoured vehicles in the mid-1990s (Human Rights Watch, 2003, 
p. 457).  Furthermore, although the Soviet Union and later Russia had historically 
provided around 75 percent of Sudan’s ‘major weapon systems’, China has sold military 
aircraft to Sudan since the 1960s, selling Sudan six to seven F-7M fighter aircraft in 
1997, twenty A-5C Fantan fighter bombers in 2003 and six K-8 advanced trainer 
aircraft in 2006 (Shinn, 2009, p. 90). In addition, China supplied around 90 percent of 
the Khartoum government’s small arms purchases from 2004-2006, averaging US$14 
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 However, it should be noted that these figures were drawn from a report issued by the 
Bank of Sudan which are inconsistent with other estimates by both the IMF and Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce (Large, 2008, p. 105). 
23
 Carmody and Taylor note that “at a global scale there appears to be a positive 
correlation between levels of Chinese investment and arms sales to recipient countries” 
(2010, p. 497) 
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million each year between 2003-2006 (Jakobson, 2009, p. 419; Shinn, 2009, p. 90). 
From the late 1990s China also helped Khartoum establish what would become the third 
largest domestic arms industry in Africa, including three weapons factories, one of 
which was designed for assembling Chinese tanks (Shinn, 2009, p. 89; Sutter, 2012, p. 
321). Following talks between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and PLA in Beijing 
in March 2002 military relations rapidly deepened. This manifested in high profile state-
to-state diplomatic relations including talks between senior military figures at the 
Sudanese Ministry of National Defence in October 2005, and the Chinese tour of the 
SAF Chief of Joint Staff in April 2007 (Large, 2008, p. 98).  
 
China and South Sudan: Diplomacy and Investment 
The succession of South Sudan in 2011 fundamentally changed China’s diplomatic and 
economic relationship with Sudan as, although Sudan has the necessary refineries and 
pipelines, South Sudan possesses around 75 percent of the oil reserves and is deeply 
embittered against the Khartoum government (Sarwar, 2012, p. 174). Furthermore, 
China’s involvement with the Khartoum regime and complicity in ‘state-sponsored 
violence’24 has undermined China’s perceived legitimacy among local populations, 
especially in the war-ravaged South (Hirono, 2011, p. 339). However, despite this 
‘lingering uneasiness’ among the southern population, the South Sudanese government 
is taking a pragmatic stance towards Chinese investment, looking forwards to important 
Chinese economic engagement in “energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, and 
agriculture” (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 4). South Sudan’s need for Chinese 
investment to upgrade its woefully inadequate road network
25
, develop agricultural 
irrigation systems, and create a public water supply system overrides past feelings of 
animosity (Sarwar, 2012, p. 177). Furthermore, following the announcement in 2012 of 
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 Chinese investment in the Sudanese oil industry, readily available capital, and 
diplomatic support has been crucial in maintaining NCP rule and preventing foreign 
intervention, whilst its provision of arms and assistance in developing arms factories has 
greatly facilitated Khartoum’s persecution of minorities (Large, 2009, p. 618). In 
addition, CNPC’s complicity in the Sudanese government’s aggressive pursuit of oil 
sources during the 1990s has politicised China’s position among armed factions 
opposed to the government, as Taban notes “while the Nuer nationality was being 
depopulated and its villages razed to the ground in Unity State in the relentless search 
and exploitation of oil, the Chinese continues their work as if nothing was happening” 
(Cited in Large, 2008, p. 97). 
25
 South Sudan’s road network spans just over 12,600 km of which 8,600 km is unsafe 
or undrivable and much more impassable during the rainy season (Sarwar, 2012, p. 177; 
International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 16). 
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Juba’s ambitious ten-year plan to develop 12,000 km of new roads to create national 
roads and connect state capitals, estimated to cost $US6 billion, China’s Exim Bank was 
one of the largest financiers to offer its services to the road ministry, replicating 
previously successful road-building efforts throughout Africa (International Crisis 
Group, 2012, p. 16-17).  
 
Since South Sudan’s independence in 2011 tensions with Khartoum have remained at 
boiling point, with border skirmishes, air raids and the continued threat of all-out war
 26
 
(Sarwar, 2012, p. 177). Despite attempts between November 2011 and February 2012 to 
establish transitional financial arrangements and oil deals between the two countries 
“dramatically different proposals, heightened hostilities along the border, brinkmanship 
and dangerous unilateral actions… caused the talks to end without agreement and 
ultimately led Juba to shut down its oil production” (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 
26). Although China’s investment in Sudanese oil and military involvement with 
Khartoum would make them a logical mediator in this dispute
 27, “Beijing’s influence, 
and readiness to employ it, appeared to be overestimated” (International Crisis Group, 
2012, p. 26). Despite criticism of the export shutdown as “very serious and unjustified” 
by Beijing’s ambassador to Khartoum Luo Xiaoguang, China maintained a neutral 
stance throughout the crisis, refusing to either support its old political ally or back the 
oil-rich South Sudanese regime, as Beijing’s ambassador to Juba Li Zhiguo noted “the 
issue is an internal affair of the two brothers of Sudan” (Xinhua, 2011, July 11). 
Although the impasse between Sudan and South Sudan was finally overcome almost 15 
months later as a result of African Union-mediated negotiations, China’s lack of action 
frustrated the two neighbours (Bariyo, 2013). In addition, China’s passive role 
emphasised its diplomatic limitations as a world power unable to abandon an ‘old ally’, 
especially given Sudan’s status as the first site of China’s ‘go out’ policy, but unwilling 
to exert pressure against South Sudan which would be counter-productive to its 
economic interests.  
                                                        
26
 An attack by South Sudanese armed forces on the disputed Heglig region in South 
Kordofan in April 2012, precipitated an aggressive response from the Sudanese 
parliament which labeled South Sudan an ‘enemy state’ and mobilized the armed forces 
(Al-Jazeera, 2012, April 17). 
27
 In November 2011, in the context of heightened tensions between North and South 
Sudan, the vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission pledged to increase 
military cooperation with Khartoum during a visit by the defence minister to China 
(Sudan Tribune, 2011, November 16). 
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Chapter Four: China, Sudan and Arrighi 
 
This chapter will investigate the degree to which relations between China, Sudan and 
South Sudan confirm and/or challenge Arrighi’s conception of the modern World-
System. It also analyses trade, investment and diplomacy between China and Sudan 
within the context of core-periphery relations, declining US hegemony and China’s 
potential hegemonic challenge. As such, this chapter situates Sino-Sudanese relations 
within the context of rising Chinese political and economic influence on the African 
continent and the impact of this on US hegemony. It also details the ways in which 
China’s economic involvement with Khartoum and support for Sudan at international 
institutions undermines the financial and diplomatic institutions underpinning US 
hegemony. This chapter will also examine how the increased untenability of conflicting 
strands of China’s current policy towards Sudan is damaging China’s influence in South 
Sudan and wider attempts to undermine US hegemony.  
 
The Failure of the West in Sudan 
China’s relationship with the newly independent republic of South Sudan is clearly 
motivated by economic interests, with diplomatic relations “at best complimentary to 
economic pursuits” (International Crisis Group, 2012, p.2). Likewise, Sudanese and 
South Sudanese motivations in deepening engagement with China are primarily 
economic, although China’s political support at multinational organisations such as the 
UN is also an integral factor. During the 1970s and 1980s IMF Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) led to an increase in poverty and food insecurity within Sudan – 
beyond the already inequitable distribution of wealth between North and South, and 
state elites and citizens – thus leaving Sudan more willing to adopt China’s 
development strategies (Abdalla, 2008, p. 18). The stringent IMF/World bank 
conditions imposed on Sudan under the SAPs included liberalisation and privatisation 
of the economy, a decreased exchange rate and anti-inflationary policies which resulted 
in devaluation of the national currency, elevated inflation, a steeply increased financial 
deficit, and economic stagnation
28
 (Abdalla, 2008, p. 18). Western institutions 
consequently lost legitimacy both in Sudan and across Africa, confirming Arrighi’s 
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 Between 1989 and 1993 the government budget deficit rose from 9 to 68 billion 
Sudanese pounds, whilst food prices increased by a mind-bogglingly 2,280 percent 
(Abdalla, 2008, p. 18) 
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argument that the failure of SAPs “posed increasingly insurmountable problems of 
social and political legitimacy for the reproduction of Northern domination” (Arrighi, 
2007, p. 95). 
 
Arrighi’s argument that the SAPs “restrain[ed]… the growth of agricultural productivity 
and domestic markets ... [and thereby] perpetuated the dependence of African 
economies on the growth of world demand for primary products” astutely summarises 
Sudan’s experience of structural adjustment (Arrighi, 2002, p. 11). World Bank loan 
conditions that required agrarian modernisation greatly damage subsistence agriculture 
in Sudan. The shift to mechanised cash crop production, in a context of internal conflict 
and natural disasters, undermined traditional land tenure, markets and farming methods, 
thus weakening the “adaptive mechanisms of rural people and limited their resistance to 
poverty” (Elhadary and Samat, 2012, p. 213). The subsequent decline in agriculture also 
greatly reduced food security within Sudan transforming the “bread basket of the Arab 
World” into a country heavily dependent on food imports29 (Elhadary and Samat, 2012, 
p. 215). Forced acquisition of vast tracts of land from traditional producers by 
Khartoum resulted in substantial rural-to-urban migration, contributing towards 
unplanned urbanisation and thereby raising poverty levels
30
 (Elhadary and Samat, 2012, 
p. 216).  
 
Challenging US Hegemony 
China’s key role in Sudanese economic recovery during the 1990s is an important 
element in their erosion of US hegemony in the region, as Arrighi notes “China has 
played a leading role… in rerouting the Southern surplus to Southern destinations… 
thereby relaxing the hold of the IMF and other Northern-controlled financial institutions 
on Southern countries” (2007, p. 382). The significant improvement in Sudan’s 
economy was largely the result of Chinese-led foreign investment in the Sudanese oil 
industry, with GDP increasing by an average of 6 percent each year from 1997 onwards 
                                                        
29
 According to the Central Bank of Sudan, over one third of Sudan’s imported goods in 
2009 were foodstuffs (Elhadary and Samat, 2012, p. 215).  
30
 According to Mahran (2006) more than half of Sudan’s urban populace are living in 
poverty, whilst 90 percent of Sudan’s population is classified as ‘poor’ (Cited in 
Elhadary and Samat, 2012, p. 213, 217). Furthermore, Musa (2002) notes that the 
adoption of the SAP not only left five million employees’ ownership destitute but, as a 
result of sharp increases in the cost of living, also pushed many former government 
officials into poverty (Cited in Elhadary and Samat, 2012, p. 214). 
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(Abdalla, 2008, p. 19). Whereas between 1986 and 1996 the urban population below the 
poverty line increased from 52.9 to 84.6 percent, Chinese-led economic growth led 
poverty to decline from 64 to 46 percent between 2005 and 2009 (Abdalla, 2008, p. 13: 
Elhadary and Samat, 2012, p. 218). Drastically improved economic growth rates and a 
powerful new political ally enabled Khartoum to cut ties with Western financial 
institutions in the 1990s and pursue a state-sponsored economic reform program 
supported by Chinese investment (Elhadary & Samat, 2012, p. 218). 
 
China’s discussions with Sudan and South Sudan about expanding agricultural 
cooperation have enhanced Chinese influence in the region, as agriculture still 
comprised 42 percent of Sudan’s GDP in 1999 and employed around 66 percent of the 
population (Abdalla, 2008, p. 17). Thus, China’s mutually profitable relationships with 
Sudan and South Sudan, alongside bitter disillusionment with Western financial 
institutions, foster hostility towards Western-style reform in favour of Chinese-backed 
financial growth. Thus, China has not only broken Sudan’s dependency on Western 
financial institutions but, as Arrighi argues, also redirected a portion of the world’s 
surplus away from the US ‘entrepot’ and into Sudan, “diminish[ing]… the IMF’s 
influence over global economic policy” (Arrighi, 2007, p. 382). Furthermore, the 
reduction of urban poverty and growth in Sudan’s GDP in recent years because of its 
relationship with China has further confirmed Ramo’s notion of China as a model state, 
promoting economic growth in developing nations without exerting undue influence 
(Arrighi, 2007, p. 379). As such, African leaders are increasingly drawn towards China 
as both an alternative to Western models and a source of readily available money with 
few preconditions. This supports Arrighi’s assertion that Sino-African linkages are 
“shaking up the continent’s historical links with Europe and the United States” and 
thereby undermining US hegemony (Arrighi, Silver & Brewer, 2003, p. 78). In addition, 
given sustained US efforts in recent years to isolate Sudan, China’s willingness to 
economically engage with Sudan has undermined America’s international sanctions 
regime, providing an additional blow to US hegemony. 
 
China’s willingness to sell arms to pariah states such as Sudan, and their reluctance to 
enforce UN prohibitions on their use in regions like Darfur, decreases international 
confidence in the UN Security Council’s coercive powers and consequently the United 
States’ capacity for international leadership. The Sino-Sudanese arms trade diverts 
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significant funds away from productive areas of the Sudanese economy, but is an 
integral aspects of the nations’ economic relationship. This, together with China’s 
support for domestic Sudanese arms production, is also a challenge to US hegemony 
through its undermining of the UN embargo on arms transfers to state and non-state 
entities fighting in Darfur (Shinn, 2009, p. 90). Although China continued to sell 
weapons, military equipment and ammunition to Sudan, in line with UN sanctions 
China stipulated that “weapons sold to the Sudan government… [were] not to be used in 
Darfur and… [did] not sell arms to non-state entities” (Shinn, 2009, p. 90). However, in 
2006 a UN panel’s identification of 222 military vehicles and vast numbers of Chinese 
shell casings used in Darfur provided “compelling evidence” of Chinese complicity 
(Shinn, 2009, p. 90). Furthermore, although Chinese authorisation of the use of its 
armaments in Darfur has not been proved, and it remains possible that Chinese “arms 
ended up in Darfur via a third country or middleman-merchant” (Jakobson, 2009, p. 
420), there is also “no indication that it has tried hard to prevent its use there” (Shinn, 
2009, p. 98). By undermining US sanctions China is reducing international confidence 
in America’s ability to effectively lead other states, thus weakening US hegemony. And 
as Arrighi notes, when “confidence in their rulers… wanes… systems of domination 
can [no longer] be run without resort to coercion” (Arrighi, 2005, p. 32). 
 
China’s support for Sudan at multinational institutions such as the UN is an important 
aspect their relations that undermines the capability of the UN to resolve national 
conflicts and challenges UN humanitarian norms. Between early 2004 and late 2006 
China played a critical role in obstructing UN resolutions that could effectively relieve 
conflict in the Darfur region. Through a combination of blocking resolutions and 
threatening to use its veto, China forced the UN Security Council to remove all 
enforcement mechanisms from proposals such as UN Security Resolution 1556, which 
initially demanded that Khartoum dissolve the janjaweed and allow humanitarian 
assistance in Darfur: “rendering the resolution essentially useless” (Halper, 2010, p. 
100). However, although China abstained on most UN resolutions against Khartoum 
until 2007, Beijing began to tentatively adopt a more accommodating stance on Darfur 
from 2005 onwards (Carmody & Taylor, 2010, p. 501).
31
 China’s shift in policy from 
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 In the adoption of three resolutions during March 2005, China struck a more 
“conciliatory tone” showing “greater willingness to discuss the resolutions provided that 
the integrity of the country [Sudan] would be guaranteed” (Carmody & Taylor, 2010, p. 
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unconditional support and obstructionism towards limited support for UN intervention 
resulted not only from mounting international pressure in the run up to the 2008 Beijing 
Olympic Games, but China’s anxieties over its international image (Shinn, 2009, p. 91). 
The appointment of special Chinese ambassadors to Sudan and Africa in 2007 to 
mitigate damage to its international image, alongside greater willingness of CCP 
officials to express guarded criticism of Khartoum, demonstrated China’s desire to 
appear as a responsible rising power and the growing untenability of its position in 
Sudan (Scott, 2008, p. 32). However, continued Chinese hostility towards UN attempts 
to ‘violate’ Sudanese sovereignty implicitly challenges Western rules and norms as 
institutionalised by the UN Charter, and undermines confidence in UN Security Council 
members’ capacity to mobilize consent and cooperation internationally. Furthermore, as 
Arrighi argues that “voting rights [in the UN] were skewed in favour of the Western 
great powers” institutionalizing US hegemony, failure to mobilise consent among the 
Security Council directly undermines US hegemony (Silver & Slater, 1999, p. 210) 
 
The inability of the US to mobilise support for militarily intervention in Sudan and 
China’s key role in acquiring Khartoum’s consent for foreign intervention in Darfur has 
reduced international confidence in US capacity to lead, a key component of what 
constitutes Gramsci’s notion of hegemony (Arrighi & Silver, 1999, p. 26). China’s 
changing diplomatic engagement with Sudan constitutes a major departure from the 
established norms of Chinese overseas engagement with African countries in its use of 
hard economic power to pressure Khartoum to comply with UN requests. High-level 
diplomatic visits to Sudan by leading CCP officials such as Chinese president Hu Jintao 
in February 2007, in which he pledged to deepen economic commitment,
32
 were 
employed to pressure Khartoum into implementing “its commitment to support, protect, 
and facilitate all humanitarian operation in Darfur” and accept “a UN-AU peacekeeping 
mission in Darfur”(Shinn, 2009, p. 92, 91). Chinese moves to press Khartoum into 
complying with international requests at international forums were instrumental in 
persuading Al-Bashir’s regime into allowing a joint UN-African Union peacekeeping 
                                                                                                                                                                  
501). Furthermore, in 2006 the Chinese government provided AU forces in Sudan with 
US$3.5 million in budgetary support and aid, before later voting in favour of an 
expanded UN peacekeeping presence in Khartoum (Holslag, 2009, p. 31; Hong, 2011, 
p. 113-114). 
32
 During this visit Hu Jintao announced the intention to write off US$70 million in 
debt, and provide US$4.8 million in humanitarian aid, and $US13 million in interest 
free loans (Shinn, 2009, p. 91). 
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mission into the Darfur region (Shinn, 2009, p. 92). Acknowledgement of the key role 
played by China in encouraging China to accept a UNAMID force by important figures, 
such as US Special Envoy to Sudan Andrew Natsios, has also led to increased 
international awareness of China’s immense influence in Sudan (Raine, 2009, p. 186). 
However, this acknowledgement also amounts to recognition of the limitations of the 
Western powers in mobilising cooperation and enforcing coercive measures in Sudan, 
especially that of the US which was the key agitator for international intervention. 
 
The Limits of the China’s Hegemonic Challenge 
Despite growing economic engagement with Sudan, China’s political presence remains 
comparatively far less sophisticated as a result of its statist approach to diplomatic 
relations. Whereas China has engaged diplomatically with Khartoum and the SPLM in a 
number of ways, Chinese peacekeepers have not interacted with local rebel groups such 
as the JEM and Sudan Liberation Army, reinforcing a negative perception of China as a 
friend of the regime (Hirono, 2011, p. 338). Chinese intervention is thus often regarding 
with hostility in areas governed by non-government factions marginalised by Khartoum 
(Hirono, 2011, p. 329-330, 338). Furthermore, despite expanded economic relations 
between China and the Republic of South Sudan since 2005 tension between the two 
allies remains high, with South Sudan accusing China of under-reporting oil well 
numbers during the oil shutdown, and consequently expelling the president of Petrodar 
Liu Yingcai (International Crisis Group, p. 30-31). More recently, relations between 
Juba and Beijing were further strained by CNPC’s rejection of South Sudan’s proposal 
to construct an alternate oil pipeline to Kenya that would render the existing pipeline 
obsolete (the cost of which has not yet been recouped) and disencourage negotiations 
with Khartoum (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 25; The Oil Daily, 2012). In 
addition, despite deepening economic engagement between China and South Sudan, 
heightened concerns in the south regarding dubious Chinese practices
33
 andincreased 
US investment in road-building threatens to undermine China’s influence in the region 
(International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 17). Thus, although China has carved out a sphere 
of influence in Sudan and South Sudan, as part of its theatre-level strategy in Africa of 
                                                        
33
 Millions of dollars in government revenue has already disappeared, whilst senior 
officials have also expressed displeasure over attempts by Chinese companies to ‘court’ 
government officials in order to secure lucrative land deals (International Crisis Group, 
2012, p. 12).  
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containing US hegemony, China’s lack of a sophisticated political presence threatens to 
undermine Chinese influence in South Sudan and marginalised areas of Sudan. 
 
Chinese willingness to economically and diplomatically support regimes such as Sudan 
and Zimbabwe has garnered criticism among both the Western powers and throughout 
the global South, as Alden notes “by actively courting ‘pariah regimes’… [China has] 
found itself at odds with an emerging consensus on the necessity of good governance 
within Africa itself” (2008, p. 21). Although China presents a challenge to US 
hegemony in the region, China’s inability to “lead society in a direction that …is … 
perceived by subordinate groups as serving a more general interest” also threatens to 
undermine Chinese attempts to gain influence (Arrighi, 2005, p. 32). China’s 
indifference to human rights abuses and responsible governance was the subject of 
discussion at the 2008 Sino-African Business Forum, where it was noted that “China’s 
involvement with African regimes in trouble spots reduced pressure on combatants to 
make compromises and address causes of the conflicts” (Yu, 2010, p. 146). 
Furthermore, Chinese support for Khartoum and concern over Chinese interest in long-
term growth in Africa also led South Africa and Senegal to develop the New Partnership 
for African Development (NEPAD) which obliged participating African and G8  
countries to “agree to adherence to ‘best practice[s]’ in pursuing democratic governance 
and liberal market criteria” (Alden, 2007, p. 98). China’s adherence to the policy of 
non-interference in Sudan ran contrary to the expectations of other African nations that 
China would help resolve the conflict, undermining the image of China as a responsible 
world power (Holslag, 2009, p. 25). Although China’s belated use of indirect influence 
to reduce violence in the Darfur region largely redressed the damage to its image, 
China’s reluctance to interfere in Sudan revealed the limitations of China’s policies of 
non-interference, and undermined China’s attempts to tempt African nations away from 
their traditional Western trading partners with low-interest long-term loans. 
 
Core-Periphery relations 
The Sino-Sudanese relationship reflects Arrighi’s notion of the asymmetrical and 
exploitative hierarchy between core and periphery, structured against the interests of 
peripheral states so as to largely benefit core powers and elites in peripheral countries. 
Many authors have been critical of Chinese investment in the Sudanese oil industry 
noting that although “the new and expanding wealth of the Khartoum boom may have 
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been a reality in the capital… very little of this new wealth ‘trickled down’ into the 
countryside” (Collins, 2008, p. 238). Despite an economic growth rate of around 8 
percent between 1991 and 1997, poverty increased between 1990 and 1996 by almost 
20 percent, largely as a result of the concentration of wealth in the hands of privileged 
state elites who benefit directly from the expanding oil industry (Abdalla, 2008, p. 13). 
Although the discovery of oil greatly enhanced government revenue
34
 and generally 
improved the economy, the allocation of resources away from productive enterprises 
and towards non-productive economic sectors, such as arms purchases and expanding 
the bureaucracy, has contributed to high levels of unemployment (Elhadary & Samat, 
2012, p. 216). Furthermore, oil development became “deeply interwoven in patterns of 
conflict in Southern Sudan” (Large, 2007, p. 59), as grossly enlarged government oil 
revenues facilitated the development of the Sudanese arms manufacturing industry and 
the expansion of the Sudanese war machine
35
 (Large, 2007, p. 59). In addition, the 
reorientation of the Sudanese economy away from agriculture and towards the 
exportation of oil
36
 degraded the livelihood of remaining traditional land-owners whilst 
also consolidating the Khartoum’s resource base and reinforcing its military power 
(Large, 2008, p. 98). Thus, the disadvantageous outcome of oil development for much 
of the Sudanese population, the benefits of which are siphoned directly to local elites 
and Chinese businesses, conforms to Arrighi’s interpretation of core-periphery relations.  
 
Although China is notably the largest provider of aid to Sudan, usually in the form of 
oil-oriented infrastructure projects, Chinese aid to Sudan is also instrumental in 
maintaining the status quo of core-periphery relations. Armed conflict in the Western 
Upper Nile/Unity State region escalated dramatically following the arrival of Talisman 
Energy in 1998, as Sudanese military forces freely used the all-weather airstrip at 
Heglig and expansive road system constructed by the oil companies to transport heavy 
equipment, enabling “armoured personnel carriers… to reach the government’s targeted 
                                                        
34
 The amount of revenue garnered from oil sales constituted 42 percent of total 
government revenue in 2001 (Human Rights Watch, 2003, p. 59). 
35
 The beginning of large scale oil exports in 1998 resulted in an 857.7 percent increase 
in oil revenues between 1999 and 2001, accompanied by a 45 percent increase in 
military expenditures (Abdalla, 2008, p. 13, Human Rights Watch, 2003, p. 59). 
Military spending in 2001 alone accounted for US$349 million, over 60 percent of oil 
revenue received that year (Human Rights Watch, 2003, p. 59). 
36
 The contribution of revenue generated by oil exports to the GDP increased 32 percent 
between 1998 and 2000, whilst the contribution of agriculture decreased from 50 
percent in 2000 to 34 percent in 2009 (Elhadary & Samat, 2012, p. 215). 
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villages… in much less time than before” (Human Rights Watch, 2003, p. 66). Human 
Rights Watch argues that CNPC shares complicity with Talisman, as they “laid the 
groundwork for the project that Talisman then completed” (Human Rights Watch, 2003, 
p. 67). Furthermore, when the Sudanese military and Baqqara Murahiliin began to 
forcefully depopulate the regions in West Nile to expand oil production in 2001, armed 
Chinese workers and Mujahidin assisted in the process (Collins, 2008, p. 233). More 
recently, the Power Construction Corporation of China (PCCC) began work on a $US63 
million road project, financed by China’s Exim Bank, which was identified by the 
Sudan Revolutionary Front and the US-based Satellite Sentinel Project as intended for 
‘military purposes’ (Anonymous, 2012, p. 19178). As such, the way Chinese aid is 
allocated towards facilitating trade and bolstering Khartoum’s military and political 
foundations accords well with the World-Systems Theory interpretation of aid as a 
means of promoting the “interests of core capitalist states… by ensuring functional 
military structures, and the maintenance of law and order” (Hahn, 2008, p. 148) 
 
Economic relations between China and Sudan also conform to Arrighi’s notions of core-
peripheral relations as exploitative through the redirection of the overwhelming amount 
of economic gains towards China and elites within the Sudanese government. Although 
the “dictatorial, corrupt and centralizing” behaviour of Khartoum has played a key role 
in rising unemployment and high poverty levels in Sudan, the extensive use of Chinese 
labourers by Chinese SOEs has also channeled wealth towards Khartoum elites instead 
of the population (Mendes & Nascimento, 2009, p. 15). Although the CNPC has 
employed over 4,000 Sudanese and 7,000 contract workers, almost 50 percent of the 
revenue of the ‘Sudan project’ went directly to the Sudanese government (Hong, 2011, 
p. 111). For example, although the CPECC claims that it made no profit on the pipeline, 
refinery and two oil well projects it constructed as part of the GNPOC project, the use 
of 10,000 skilled Chinese labourers largely reduced the costs and kept the money 
circulating within the Chinese economy (Human Rights Watch, 2003, p. 459-460). The 
extensive use of Chinese labour by Chinese SOEs, alongside indifference to worker’s 
rights has drawn increased criticism among local populations especially throughout the 
South (Hofstedt, 2009, p. 88). China’s economic relationship with Sudan vis-à-vis 
investment in the oil industry is consistent with that of core and peripheral countries 
according to Arrighi in that power blocks within China tied to “manufacturing and 
commercial interests” have formed relations with elites in Sudan “tied to the needs of 
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core capital” for mutual economic benefit (Chase-Dunn & Rubinson, 1991, p. 38). 
Furthermore, in accordance with World-Systems Theory this relationship has mostly 
benefitted the economic interests of China as the alliance between domestic elites in 
both countries has not only ensured Chinese access to natural resources and “traditional 
modes of surplus extraction” but offers a site to absorb China’s vast labour surpluses 
and manufactured goods (Hahn, 2008, p. 148). 
 
The asymmetrical economic relationship between China and Sudan based on Chinese 
interests, wherein the importance of Chinese investment and trade to Sudan exceeds the 
importance of Sudanese oil to China is also representative of core-periphery relations
37
 
(Large, 2009, p. 616). Although both India and Malaysia have invested in the Sudanese 
oil industry and established limited trade networks “No country’s trade ties with Sudan 
come close to the importance of China’s” (International Monetary Fund, 2008, p. 467). 
In addition, although China’s goal in diversifying its economic activities in Sudan may 
indeed be “to create a level of economic interdependence that will lead to greater trade, 
including the purchase of oil and gas supplies” (Hong, 2011, p. 111), Chinese 
investment remains heavily concentrated in the oil industry. Furthermore, the 
proliferation of Chinese small entrepreneurs and traders capable of employing supply 
chains back to China to outcompete Sudanese business has created tension especially 
among local traders and craftsmen (Alden, 2007, p. 43). Thus, Chinese economic 
involvement in Sudan and South Sudan is almost entirely based on commercial 
profitability, in the pursuit of which it employs hard economic power to negotiate 
contracts based exclusively on Chinese interests. As such, the unequal economic 
relationship with respect to the oil trade between China and Sudan, and China and South 
Sudan, also confirms Arrighi’s understandings of core-periphery relations as an 
exploitative process which overwhelmingly benefits core powers such as China. 
 
 
China’s relationship with Sudan and South Sudan has recently undergone changes, due 
the secession of South Sudan and the increasingly strong position of Sudan and South 
Sudan vis-à-vis China, which challenge the assertion within World-Systems Theory that 
                                                        
37
 Although Sudan exports around 65 percent of its oil to China, totalling approximately 
10.3 million tonnes in 2007, Sudanese oil represents only 6.32 percent of China’s net oil 
imports (Hong, 2011, p. 106, Ministry of Commerce cited in Lee, Chan & Chan, 2011, 
p. 431). 
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the “core systematically underdevelops the dependent periphery areas both politically 
and economically” (Isaak, 1991, p. 23). Although China’s preferential credit line to 
Khartoum is expansive, officially amounting to around US$1.9 billion in 2010
38
, and 
thereby providing China with economic leverage over the GoS, such extensive lending 
also “makes Beijing a hostage… as it will lose its credibility and influence if it 
overreaches politically” (Hong, 2011, p. 118). Furthermore, given the CNPC’s heavy 
investment in the oil industry China is bound to continue lending money even though 
Sudan is unlikely to be in a position to repay the extensive loans, as International Crisis 
Group notes “the concession that the North would not have to make repayments for five 
years was in effect a recognition of reality, since Khartoum was unlikely to have been 
able to do so in any event” (2012, p. 27). In addition, the renegotiation of oil contracts 
between South Sudan and China following its succession in 2011 considerably 
strengthened Juba’s control over the oil industry and “previously neglected social, 
environmental and employment standards…bring[ing] oil company interests in line with 
its own” (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. ii). Thus, although China’s extensive 
economic investment in Sudan and South Sudan fosters economic interdependence, and 
aligns Khartoum and Juba’s interests with its own, consistent with its policy of “shaking 
up the continents historical links” (Arrighi, Silver & Brewer, 2003, p. 78), it also makes 
Beijing a hostage whose influence can only be exerted sparingly.  
 
SOE’s and State/Capital Interests 
The escalation of Chinese investment in Sudan not only reflects the belief among 
Chinese officials that national oil enhances national energy security but also confirms 
Arrighi’s argument that Chinese SOEs largely operate independently of state policy as 
private enterprises. However, Chinese officials have become increasingly disenchanted 
with the notion of Sudanese equity oil as a cheaper and more secure alternative to the 
international market as Chinese SOEs have transitioned towards selling national oil on 
the world market for a much higher price, often to competitors in energy security
39
. 
Furthermore, the lack of adequate oversight agencies capable of exerting direct 
authority over SOEs in Sudan has meant that Chinese companies have continued to 
invest in Sudan long after China has ceased financial incentives for investment, and 
                                                        
38
 However, actual debt owing to China is thought to be much higher than what has 
been acknowledged (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 27). 
39
 In 2006, it is estimated that only 24 per cent of Chinese equity oil in Sudan was sent 
back to China, whilst 65 percent was sold to Japan (Tunsjø, 2010, p. 34).  
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have indeed escalated the level of engagement
40
. The escalation of investment in Sudan 
against the wishes of many leading Chinese officials has led to criticism of the conduct 
of SOEs in Sudan as having “hijacked China’s foreign policy in Sudan” (McGregor, 
2008, March 17), pursuing “profit at the expense of broader national interests” (Power 
and Mohan, 2010, p. 485). Thus, although within China there is significant 
interpenetration of state/capital interests, SOEs generally operate as private enterprises 
bound to the national interest but often acting independently of central state policy in 
accordance with Arrighi’s theoretical framework (Arrighi, 2007). 
                                                        
40
 For example, from 2003 onwards Sudan was not only the country CNPC most heavily 
invested in, but of all overseas Chinese investments represented the company’s “single 
greatest commercial success” (Carmody & Taylor, 2010, p. 509; Jakobson, 2009, p. 
418). 
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Conclusion 
 
The relationship which has emerged between China and Sudan since the early 1990s is 
complex, multifaceted, and fundamentally different from that which preceded it. The 
deepening of Chinese investment in the oil industry from the late 1990s onwards has 
resulted in far more significant Sino-Sudanese economic and diplomatic relations. 
While Chinese involvement in Sudan is primarily driven by economic considerations, 
the Sudanese government is also motivated by its need for military armaments and 
diplomatic support in multinational institutions. The secession of South Sudan in 2011 
further complicated the relationship between China and Sudan, as China is unwilling to 
abandon its ‘old friend’ in the North (and its large and as yet unredeemed investments 
there), but has considerable economic interest in building good relations with the newly 
independent South. The emergence of friendly, albeit tense, diplomatic relations 
between South Sudan and China based on pragmatic economic considerations supports 
the assertion by Western commentators that “China is actively expanding its influence 
in Africa to secure supplies of natural resources, to counter Western political and 
economic influence while expanding China’s global influence” (Brooks and Shin, 2006, 
p. 1). However, many African states view rising Chinese influence with ambivalence, 
weighing the benefits of China’s long-term low-interest loans against its complicity in 
supporting authoritarian regimes and human rights violators. 
 
As per Arrighi’s understandings of World-Systems Theory, the adoption of neoliberal 
economic policies in the late 1970s by US policymakers to reverse declining US 
hegemony resulted in the rollback of third world power and escalating African debt. 
However, the transition towards neoliberalism in the World Bank and American-
dominated financial institutions also signalled the beginning of the period of 
financialisation characterised by the increasing dominance and favouring of finance 
capital over productive sectors of the society, which Arrighi claims marked the 
‘autumn’ of US hegemony. Furthermore, US difficulties in Iraq signalled the ‘terminal 
crisis’ of US hegemony, “further undermin[ing]… the centrality of the United States 
and the US dollar in the global political economy; and… [strengthening] the tendency 
towards the emergence of China as an alternative to US leadership in the East Asian 
region and beyond” (Arrighi, 2005(2), p. 1). Within this context then, does China’s 
relationship with Sudan provide insights into the ways in which China challenges US 
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hegemony, and furthermore whether African states view China as a more viable 
political and economic model than the US? (Friedman, 2010, p. 148). Given Arrighi’s 
definition of hegemony as the capacity to dominate antagonistic groups and lead society 
in a direction that is “perceived by subordinate groups as serving a more general 
interest” (Arrighi, 2005, p. 32), US hegemony is absent in Sudan. The economically 
deleterious consequences of Sudan’s adoption of World Bank loans and the later 
imposition of SAPs has left a legacy of economic stagnation and widespread poverty 
creating hostility towards Western policy prescriptions, and increased willingness to 
cooperate with other countries of the global south such as China. Furthermore, the 
instrumental role played by China in boosting Sudanese GDP and reducing poverty 
supports the view among African nations that the Chinese model presents a viable 
alternative to neoliberalism, and a source of developmental assistance without 
economically disadvantageous conditionalities (Arrighi, Silver & Brewer, 2003, p. 78). 
 
In addition, China’s economic relationships with Sudan and South Sudan are largely 
consistent with the relationship between core and peripheral countries outlined by 
World-Systems Theory. These relationships overwhelmingly benefit’s Chinese 
economic interests as although China imports more than it exports from both countries, 
the alliance between each country’s domestic elites ensures the maintenance of 
“traditional modes of surplus extraction” through Chinese access of natural resources in 
return for manufactured goods (Hahn, 2008, p. 148). As such, although China provides 
Sudan with infrastructure and wealth, only a small section of society aligned with the 
predominant elites reap the benefits of this relationship. Conversely, Sudan offers China 
a site to absorb surplus labour, offload manufactured goods and secure access to oil. 
Furthermore, the foundations of Chinese relations with both countries are based on 
pursuing China’s needs, which reflects Arrighi’s understandings of core-periphery 
relations as an exploitative process overwhelmingly benefiting core powers. In addition, 
Chinese SOEs in Sudan act in accordance with Arrighi’s theories concerning the 
interpenetration of state/capital interests (Arrighi, 2007), while the allocation of Chinese 
aid towards facilitating trade and strengthening the dominance of Al-Bashir’s regime is 
consistent with the interpretation of aid as a means of promoting ‘core’ interests (Hahn, 
2008, p. 148). However, the strengthened position of post-independence South Sudan 
vis-à-vis China and the economic leverage Sudan employs over China challenges 
Arrighi’s conception of the core-periphery relationship. 
C34: Bachelor of Arts Honours 
Benjamin Hale, ID Number 10161199 51 
 
China’s readiness to sell arms to Sudan despite UN sanctions, and continued hostility 
towards attempts by the UN to effectively intervene in Darfur undermines international 
confidence in the capacity of the members of the UN Security Council to mobilize 
consent and cooperation internationally. Furthermore Chinese reluctance to uphold, and 
allow others to uphold, the articles of the UN Charter concerning human rights 
implicitly challenges Western rules and norms and decreases international confidence in 
the collective coercive powers of the UN Security Council. Growing discontent with the 
capacity of the UN to achieve results in Sudan undermines the prestige of the dominant 
Western nations whilst undermining belief in the capacity of the US to lead and/or 
coerce fellow members into pursuing a general interest. However, China’s reluctance to 
interfere in Sudan despite Khartoum’s egregious human rights offences, and only 
belated use of indirect influence to reduce violence thereafter, deeply damaged its image 
among African countries and undermined China’s ‘soft’ diplomatic attempts to draw 
African nations away from their traditional trading partners. Furthermore, China’s lack 
of a sophisticated political presence in Sudan threatens to weaken Chinese influence in 
disaffected regions of both South and North Sudan, and undermine the longevity of 
Chinese involvement. The divergence in enthusiasm for Chinese investment between 
Sudanese elites and the general population, resulting from the redirection of the 
economic benefits of Chinese involvement to government elites, also provides a 
challenge to Chinese influence in the region. For example resistance to Al-Bashir’s 
regime, such as recent riots in Khartoum over the elimination of government subsidies 
on fuel and other basic necessities, could overturn China’s status as Sudan’s main 
trading partner (Associated Press, 2013, October 6). 
 
The relationship between China and Sudan, and South Sudan, countries which bear the 
legacy of economic stagnation and escalating poverty as a result of Western financial 
institutions, reflects Arrighi’s argument that “US hegemony…has already ended” 
(Arrighi, 2007, p. 384). Although China’s relationship with an authoritarian regime such 
as Sudan may not be typical of overall China-African relations, especially in regards to 
the arms trade, China’s success in developing economic and diplomatic relations with 
Sudan is reflective of a wider trend among African countries of looking towards China 
for aid and investment. Although China’s lack of a sophisticated diplomatic apparatus in 
Sudan, failure to uphold Western human rights norms and exploitative form of 
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economic engagement, threaten to destabilise Chinese influence in the region, Sudan’s 
sustained economic growth serves as an indicator to other impoverished African nations 
of the advantages of engaging with China. As such, although the US remains the 
world’s only ‘superpower’ with an unparalleled military apparatus, its power is waning 
as a result of the declining capacity of the US to prescribe economic policies and 
mobilise consent at international institutions. Thus, China’s success in wooing both 
Sudan and South Sudan is reflective of China’s growing influence in the region and 
declining US hegemony in Africa more generally. 
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